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Abstract: 
Many philosophical theories about immigration assume that border control is a national 
prerogative. However, in at least one important instance, this conception of border control is 
outdated. In Europe, it is increasingly the European Union that controls the external borders of 
its member states. But because the EU is most readily typified as an “Unidentified Political 
Object”, as former president of the European Commission Jacques Delors once called it, it is 
not clear whether the same principles of justice, which apply to nation states, also apply to this 
political entity? Whether such theories can be extended to the EU-level is the central question 
of this thesis. This is done, firstly, by looking into the historical developments of the 
immigration policy of the EU, including where the actual competence to control immigration is 
placed; secondly, two contemporary positions within the philosophical debate about 
immigration – Liberal Nationalism and Associative Ownership – are discussed and the 
possibility of extending their core arguments to the EU-level is assessed.  
     The key findings include that determining who controls immigration in the EU system is in 
fact quite unclear. Ascribing it to be somewhere in the interplay between the national and the 
EU seems to be the safest bet, as long as it is not possible to typify the EU more precisely. Not 
least for this reason, assessing whether Liberal Nationalism, as well as Associative Ownership, 
can be extended to apply in the EU is no easy task. Despite this conceptual lacuna, as well as 
the lack of theoretical clarity in placing jurisdiction of immigration control in the EU, then by 
focusing on the core arguments of Liberal Nationalism and Associative Ownership together, 
with a more practical approach to understanding the EU, it was possible to assess whether they 
could in fact be applied. This means that both theories could, in principle, be extended to the 
EU, albeit with some adjustments. Key concepts in this regard are territorial rights, identity, 
collective ownership and self-determination. 
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Introduction 
Perhaps the title of this study, Going International, is a bit unusual – so allow me to explain its 
deeper meaning. The title refers to two separate phenomena. Firstly, going international refers 
to migration. By definition, migration is an international phenomenon, as migrating involves 
going from one place to another, often from one country to another. Migrating may involve 
reuniting with ones family, trying ones luck working in a foreign country, fleeing from 
persecution or simply wanting to live in country more in line with ones own values. In reality 
this choice is not left up to one self. It is not ones own wishes or preferences that determine 
whether or not one can migrate to a foreign country. Rather it is the country to which one 
wishes to migrate that decides whether or not to admit you into their community. This is the 
first meaning of “going international”. Communities’ rights to restrict immigration have been 
heavily debated for many years, not least within political philosophy, which carry us over to the 
next phenomenon to which “going international” refers. Philosophical theories of immigration 
discuss the state as the number one example of a community that can be justified in restricting 
immigration. While this may be the case in most parts of the world today, there is at least one 
example where this does not seem to be the case – the European Union. Upon looking at the 
EU, it does not seem immediately obvious that it is the member states that control immigration. 
Because the EU in recent years has moved towards a shared responsibility of controlling its 
external borders, it serves as a unique example of exercising this right. The integration of 
member state competences to regulate border control into the EU-system have increased 
throughout the last couple of decades, formally starting with the Maastricht Treaty in the 
beginning of the 1990’s. But seeing as traditional philosophical theories about immigration 
discuss states’ rights to border control, can their arguments be applied to the EU-level as well? 
Or could it be that perhaps they are turning into “zombie-theories”, to use the famous Ulrich 
Beck reference about the nation state, at least in a European context? “Going International” in 
this regard refers to the central question about whether these immigration theories can be 
extended to cover the present reality of the EU-border control regime. 
 
The case of EU: Immigration and border control 
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Migration is one of the top priorities on the European Union’s political agenda. Globalization, 
demographic change and societal transformation are affecting the European Union and its 
Member States. Currently around 20.2 million third-country nationals1 (TCNs) are residing in 
the EU, amounting to about 4% of the total EU population (European Commission 2012). The 
EU member-states have a priority to attract skilled workers in particular, because some sectors, 
despite the current economic crisis, are experiencing labour-shortage. In the long run, legal 
economic immigration is seen as an important component in addressing this labour-shortage 
brought on by the ageing European population, as well as an increasingly competitive 
international market for talented students and workers (ibid). At the same time, however, 
irregular migration2 and an increasing number of asylum applicants are seen as part of an 
increasing problem of migratory pressure by both the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs Council 
(JHA Council) and the European Council (ibid). It is even mentioned as ‘a fight against 
irregular migration’ (European Commission 2013a). But what justifies differentiating the right 
to entry into a society based on this dichotomy between wanted and unwanted immigrants? 
Many people are denied more than temporary residence in the EU member states and will most 
likely never be able to be a part of the EU community. Furthermore, up to this day, several 
thousands of individuals have died trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea in the hopes of starting 
a better life away from economic and political despair. Thousands again arrive illegally to the 
EU to work in the black labour-market trying to earn enough money to send remittances back 
home. And several thousands again have been deported back to their original country of 
departure, shortly after arriving. When border control affects people’s lives in such a 
fundamental way, it needs justification. 
The question of how to justify border control has its own history in the philosophical 
debate. Some of the key scholars within this field include Robert Nozick and Michael Walzer 
                                                           
1
 Third Country Nationals can be defined as: ‘[…] The reference for all different categories of non- EU-citizens, 
such as asylum seekers, refugees, displaced persons, legal immigrants and irregular immigrants’ (Sterkx 2008: 
118). 
2
 The term “irregular migration” is used as opposed to “illegal migration” here, but is referring to the same 
phenomenon as illegal migration. Different institutions within the EU use either Irregular migration or Illegal 
migration, but ultimately, they are referring to the same thing; persons transgressing the immigration laws of a 
political community. This is most often done in our case by entering a state’s territory without permission or 
overstaying visa requirements. I have chosen to use just one term -  irregular migration – instead of using both for 
the sake of reader-friendliness, and even though I am aware of the arguments from proponents of using the term 
illegal migration, I felt that conceptually, using irregular migration was more accurate. 
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(Nozick 1974, Walzer 1984). Both are notable proponents in the classical discussion on 
justification of border control, each arguing from a libertarian and socialist standpoint 
respectively. More recent, well-known scholars include Joseph Carens, Allan Buchanan and 
David Miller (Carens, 1987, Buchanan, 2004, Miller, 2007), each arguing from their own 
philosophical standpoint. Even though these scholars each represent their own position, they all 
have at least one thing in common, namely a shared central issue: whether and how states can 
justify a right to border control. There are also other, more practice-based approaches to the 
philosophical discussion about immigration. One is to discuss the actual means of border 
control (see for instance Lemberg-Pedersen 2012, Nyberg Sørensen & Gammeltoft-Hansen 
(eds.) 2012). In this approach, the focus is just as much on the empirical investigation of the 
actual means of border control as it is on the philosophical question of immigration. Here the 
main object of investigation is not whether a state has the right to border control, but instead if 
they are justified in exercising border controls the way they are today. The approach for this 
thesis will be to try and use the best from both worlds by preserving, as our main research 
question a study of the ways in which border control can be justified, while at the same time 
looking at what the practical reality is in the field – which, in our case, is the EU. 
By going into the theoretical debate above, we have already touched upon a number of 
key concepts – such as migration and border control – which will need to be explained and 
defined before we move on. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), a private 
international organization working together with different states on migration issues, makes a 
useful division between the different forms of migration. The one most relevant to our topic is 
economic migration. They define an economic migrant as: 
 
‘A person leaving his or her habitual place of residence to settle outside his or her country 
of origin in order to improve his or her quality of life. This term is often loosely used to 
distinguish from refugees fleeing persecution, and is also similarly used to refer to persons 
attempting to enter a country without legal permission and/or by using asylum procedures 
without bona fide cause. It may equally be applied to persons leaving their country of 
origin for the purpose of employment.’ (International Organization for Migration 2013) 
 
Economic immigration in this sense then includes both legal immigrants, as well as irregular 
immigrants. The definition does not include displaced persons, refugees, asylum seekers, 
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stateless persons, reunified families, exchange students or tourists3. What is meant by economic 
immigration, then, is the phenomenon of a migrant who, for a long or permanent period of time, 
primarily motivated by economic considerations, take a job in another country. This is not to 
say that different forms of migration cannot be linked together. Often the lines between what 
type of migrant one can be categorized as can be diffusive. For that reason, the definition might 
exclude someone that should have been counted in, or include someone that should not. 
Considering that the different forms of migration are so diverse, primarily covering economic 
immigration4 to the EU in the sense above will enable us to put focus on the immigration 
theories’ most basic justification for and against immigration5. Even though the definition from 
IOM does not include refugees, because discussions about the justification for immigration 
restriction also rest on its limits (which especially concerns refugees), some space will be 
devoted to discussing their rights as well. 
I also mentioned border control as a key concept; one of the reasons it is good to clarify 
what is meant by this term from the start, is that in the literature border control is very tightly 
connected to overlapping terms such as immigration restriction, immigration control or 
immigration regulation. Some even use the term immigration management to cover what is 
going on at the borders. Except for the last term, these other terms refer to the same phenomena: 
ways for a political community to determine who can and cannot enter their community. All of 
these terms are used in the literature, which is why the reader may encounter all of these 
definitions throughout this thesis. Generally, though, they should be understood in the above 
sense. Furthermore I have not yet distinguished between border control as a means of 
preventing persons from entering the territory of the state, or of becoming actual members, 
despite the rather significant difference between the two. We can call the restrictions to the 
territory the “Physical border” (In the EU context we are discussing, the border we are primarily 
dealing with is the external border surrounding the member states) and the membership 
                                                           
3
 It should be noted that by excluding these types of migration, I am not saying that these other categories of 
immigrants do not also have an economic impact on the EU Member States or EU immigration policy priorities, 
or that they cannot be motivated to migrate by economic considerations also. 
4
 Consequently, when immigration is mentioned throughout, it is in this sense. 
5
 Oftentimes issues such as refugees or family reunification are treated as exceptions that do not follow the 
‘normal logic’ of immigration restrictions. There are other reasons of justice to include them than the ones that 
follow from regular migration management (see for instance Pevnick 2011, Miller 2007). 
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restrictions the “Membership border”. While this may seem trivial, it is a distinction that is far 
from simple. 
Take the case of a person trying to cross the physical borders of a country, without the 
necessary residence permit to stay there, versus a person fleeing her own country for political 
reasons; the person who, for no specific reason, wants to enter the territory cannot exercise very 
many rights just by crossing the physical border, and can be expelled properly if discovered. 
The same does not hold true for the person fleeing her homeland. Instead she can now exercise 
the legal right of seeking asylum in the receiving country (provided of course that the country 
have ratified the UN refugee convention), which, in cases of acceptance, lead to residence – or 
even citizenship in the long run – of the country in question. Being granted temporary or 
permanent residence gives the refugee even more rights. The rules of asylum law are such that a 
person wanting to seek asylum must be present in the territory of that very country to which he 
or she wishes to seek asylum6. The possibility to exercise this right comes into play at the 
physical border of a possible receiving state, but depending on how the actual physical border 
control is carried out, this may in some cases be impossible. Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, for 
instance, writes about the way border control of the EU is also about intercepting people 
migrating towards Europe before they can reach the territory of the European Member States 
and rightfully apply for asylum (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2007). This example shows that, 
depending on the situation and motive of the would-be migrant, the physical border can have 
different meanings and consequences, including possibilities to cross the membership border 
and obtain different kinds of rights. 
On the other hand, there can also be examples of persons having crossed the physical 
border illegally, but not the membership border, while at the same time upholding a more or 
less permanent residence in a country. The prime example of this are irregular immigrants 
working in the fruit plantations of countries like Spain or Italy, as part of the black labour-
market and without the state knowing (or with its silent acquiescence) of their presence7. These 
are, for the most part, persons for whom crossing the membership border is close to impossible. 
                                                           
6
 While this is the general rule of asylum law, The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, also operates with selection 
especially vulnerable refugees from refugee camps throughout the world who are given the opportunity to seek 
asylum in a country that have said yes to a fixed quote of asylum seekers every year – the so called quota-
refugees. 
7
 See for instance Lawrence 2011.  
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Instead of attempting to cross that border, they try and earn as much money they can while they 
are there, and in that time they uphold a more or less permanent residence in the country. This 
example shows that in this specific, albeit significant example there can be a sort of no-man’s 
land between having crossed the physical border, but living as a non –member, with little to no 
political rights, because the membership border is too hard to cross. 
The third, almost paradoxical example I want to bring focus to is visa overstayers, who, 
unlike the above example, are irregular immigrants who have crossed the physical border 
legally. Briefly explained, a visa overstayer is a person who enters a country legally with a visa 
and then, for some reason or another, chooses not leave when the visa expires. This is, in fact, 
the largest source of irregular immigration into the EU (Council on the European Union 2011) 
and it shows that the physical border can be crossed legally, but used to stay in the country 
illegally. Border control and immigration then have complex interactions which may be useful 
to have in mind in the later chapters where we will be discussing these issues. 
 
Theoretical delimitation 
We have briefly introduced some of the philosophical positions on immigration earlier. Now we 
will go a little deeper into the philosophical debate about justification of border control and try 
to introduce to some of the main positions in this field. I have chosen, as a point of departure, to 
use the division Ryan Pevnick presents in Immigration and The Constraints of Justice, from 
2011. It is useful because it provides a clear overview of the different approaches, dividing the 
field into “Open Border”, “Statism”, “Liberal Nationalism” and “Associative Ownership” 
(Pevnick 2011: 16). Firstly, I briefly present what one might call the two outer poles in the 
contemporary debate on border control, the “open borders approach” and “Statism”. Secondly, I 
present the more “moderate” approaches (moderate in the sense of being in a position in 
between Open borders and Statism), namely Liberal Nationalism and Associative Ownership. 
Having presented the chief positions of the contemporary debate, I will briefly consider 
alternative ways of theorizing immigration, namely within the field of Post-Marxism. 
First off, we have the Open Borders view which is fundamentally critical towards closed 
borders. But while proponents of the view all in some sense argue for open borders, there are 
several different justifications for this. There are three main ways of justifying open borders; 
through Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism, Libertarianism and Utilitarianism (Wellman 2012). 
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Cosmopolitan Egalitarianists argue that all human beings on the one side are equally deserving 
of moral considerations, combined with the empirical observation that the society to which you 
belong greatly impacts your possibilities in life. Because the average person coming from a 
poor country, will have done nothing to deserve the position he or she may be in, it is not 
justifiable for affluent countries to close their borders to someone in search for a better life 
(Ibid.). The libertarian justification for open borders points to the individual rights and that a 
state’s control over immigration may conflict with these. If for instance the citizen of a country 
wishes to invite an outsider onto her land, the government should have no right to prohibit her 
from doing this. This is because prohibiting the outsider from entry both violate the outsider’s 
right to freedom of movement and the citizen’s property right to unilaterally invite foreigners 
onto her land (Ibid.). Lastly, the utilitarian argument for open borders points to the 
inefficiencies of restricting freedom of movement (ibid.). Presumably for instance restricting 
freedom of movement is economically inefficient and accordingly unjustifiable in the utilitarian 
view. Much more could be said about these different approaches to justify open borders, but for 
now, this will have to suffice. One of the main contemporary proponents of this view is Joseph 
Carens, who published the landmark essay Aliens and Citizens in 1987 (Carens 1987). 
On the other side of the spectrum we have Statism, which, with the words of Pevnick, 
endorses the view that ‘justice [is] inapplicable beyond state borders and, accordingly, that 
citizens should select that immigration policy which is best for current citizens’ (Pevnick 2011: 
8). According to this view, states have a unilateral right to close their own borders, as well as 
being justified in only pursuing their own national interests – justice does not extend beyond 
state borders. This view most likely belongs to the minority within contemporary philosophical 
literature, but an exponent for this approach can be found in George Borjas (Borjas 1999). 
In between Open Borders and Statism, we have Liberal Nationalism and Associative 
Ownership. David Miller is one of the well-known exponents of Liberal Nationalism, and even 
though his position has been modified throughout his career, Miller at least keeps the role of 
society’s shared identity as a central part of his position8. Miller’s central claim is that states can 
be justified in claiming territorial rights over a piece of land, as well as a claim to the added 
value created by controlling it. In conjunction with having a common national identity and the 
                                                           
8
 I will mainly be concerned with the more recent part of Miller’s publications, especially with his most recent 
book, National Responsibility and Global Justice from 2007. 
 10 
right to self-determination of the citizens, states have the right, as representative of the people it 
governs, to unilaterally close their borders for immigration, except in particular situations, such 
as when people are in need. 
Another approach to justifying border control is the Associative Ownership approach, 
advocated here by Ryan Pevnick (Pevnick 2011). The basic idea behind the theory is that a 
community can have the right to self-determination on the basis of ownership over the 
community’s institutions. Having the right to self-determination in combination with ownership 
is what justifies border control. A national community, for instance, can choose who its future 
citizens should be when they have a justified ownership claim over the institutions it created. 
Because of the contribution a member of a community provides to the community’s institutions, 
that member has, as a part of a collective, an ownership claim over that institution. Collectively 
owning the institutions of their society, then, gives the community the right to self-
determination. 
It is these two, latter approaches that I will be exploring. This is because my overall 
interest is to combine the empirical analysis of the EU-border control regime, where the right to 
control borders resides within the EU-system, with contemporary discussions about 
immigration. Liberal Nationalism is interesting in this regard, because it takes its point of 
departure in the national. It discusses states’ rights to control their borders and furthermore 
operates with concepts such as national identity and cultural values, which may not seem 
immediately applicable to the real world case of the EU. The basic arguments in Associative 
Ownership does not in the same way relate to the national. Rather, it operates with the rights of 
communities based on their ownership over institutions. Intuitively, then, Associative 
Ownership seems more extendable to cover the EU-level. Both views will be explored, in order 
to study whether they can be extended to cover the EU-level. And while my focus is on these 
two views, it might very well be that my findings can be used to analyse other positions’ 
“extendability” as well.  
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Table 1: Overview of central positions regarding justice and immigration9  
 Open Borders Statism Liberal 
Nationalism 
Associative Ownership 
Immigration 
restrictions?  
No Yes Yes Yes 
Who can be 
denied 
admission? 
Not applicable Anybody Non-nationals Those whose claims to 
entry do not outweigh the 
ownership claims of the 
political community 
Justification for 
denying 
admission 
Not applicable Considerations of 
justice are 
inapplicable 
beyond state 
borders 
Shared national 
culture is a 
prerequisite for a 
just society 
The political community 
has an ownership claim 
over the goods at stake 
 
Before moving on to the problem formulation, we will briefly consider an alternative way of 
theorizing immigration. In the mainstream philosophical debate, not much of the literature 
discusses immigration directly in relation to the market. If we instead turn our attention towards 
Post-Marxism, however, this link can indeed be found. Contemporary scholar Nicholas De 
Genova, for example, combines a critical attitude towards what is seen as capitalist state 
violence against individuals, with a liberal view on human beings as having the right to 
autonomy including a fundamental right to freedom of movement (De Genova & Peutz 2010). 
Combining Giorgio Agamben’s notion of the refugee as an instance of ‘bare life’ with Marx’ 
well known formulation of the commodifiability of labor, an irregular immigrant can be 
deported because: 
 
‘[…] this peculiar sociopolitical relation of juridical nonrelationality is the material and 
practical precondition for her thoroughgoing incorporation within a wider capitalist social 
formation, in which an effectively global market is fractured systemically into a political 
order of territorially delimited nation-states.’ (De Genova & Peutz 2010: 47). 
 
                                                           
9
 Adapted and adjusted from Pevnick 2011: 16. 
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The irregular immigrant can be seen as an abject to the state, because it is outside the juridical 
order of citizenship, which in turn is a product of the global capitalist division of labour. Given 
the market-driven nature of the EU’s Internal Market, including the abolition of the internal 
border control of the Union, this link between the (capitalist) economy and immigration could 
be an interesting approach to discuss immigration in relation to the EU. But even though it may 
provide a critical perspective to the debate, this is not what I am trying to achieve, as I am 
principally interested in discussing the extendibility of philosophical immigration theories. De 
Genova’s project is first and foremost to criticize capitalism in relation to immigration, while 
Miller and Pevnick in turn represent a rights-based approach to immigration, discussing states 
positive rights to control their borders. Keeping the focus on the main problem, in regard to 
theories’ extendibility, will be my priority here, even though the restrictive nature of EU 
immigration policy is a central part of the motivation for wanting to study the EU in the first 
place. Nevertheless, acknowledging the possible closer link between EU’s Internal Market and 
immigration, I have also chosen to include a bit about the single market of EU in my analysis. 
Having now introduced the empirical field of investigation, and explained my choice of 
philosophical immigration theory, let me present my problem formulation: 
 
Problem formulation: 
“How should we understand external border control in the EU, and how can 
traditional theories about states’ rights to control their own borders, be 
applied to the border of the EU?” 
 
Answering the problem formulation requires several steps. First off, it will make sense to study 
the EU in regard to how we should understand border control in that context; this is what we 
will be doing in chapter two. Central to this inquiry is the question about where the competence 
for regulating immigration rests within the EU, and how it has historically come to be like this. 
Special emphasis is put on how the different Treatises have changed this area. Furthermore, the 
EU policy output on immigration is presented. For analytical purposes, this part is divided into 
an “internal path” and an “external path”. 
In chapter three, we will begin our discussion of the first philosophical theory – Liberal 
Nationalism in the configuration of Miller. The focus is put on arguments for territorial rights 
and the most fundamental arguments for border control, as well as its limits. Throughout the 
 13 
chapter, important criticism of some of the arguments will be noted. Concluding the chapter 
will be a discussion about whether Liberal Nationalism can be extended from the state-level to 
the international EU-level. 
Chapter four follows the overall structure of chapter three, starting with the core 
arguments for the justification of border control in Associative Ownership. Picking up on the 
arguments as they come, related criticism is made throughout the chapter. Concluding the 
chapter is a discussion about whether or not the theory can be extended to the international EU-
level. 
Chapter five is the concluding chapter, where Liberal Nationalism is compared to 
Associative Ownership, in terms of their ‘extendibility’ to the EU level, and concluding 
whether they can pass the "going international" challenge I have presented. 
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The development of EU’s immigration policy 
Before discussing the immigration theories briefly outlined in chapter one, we will turn to an 
overview of the development of EU’s immigration policy. Being familiar with the historical 
background will help us grasp what is at stake when discussing the theories of immigration in 
relation to EU. Although a great part of the EU-literature is concerned with theories that explain 
the dynamics at stake in the development of EU, this chapter will not have its primary focus on 
the causes of the development of the EU immigration policies. Rather this chapter will focus on 
the actual developments of EU in a more empirical sense, in that it will concern itself with how 
different treaties have altered the institutional setting of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
policy area – ie. where immigration policy overlap with policies on asylum affairs and police 
and judicial cooperation. To put it in other words, our primary interest lies not in why it came to 
be as it is today, but in what the implications of those developments are. 
The first part of the chapter will be spent examining the issue’s historical background, 
focusing on the degree to which the national competences in the field of immigration policy 
have shifted towards “Communitarisation” (the shift of policy activity from intergovernmental 
pillars to the “Community Pillar”). This is crucially relevant if we wish to assess the 
applicability of philosophical immigration theories on the EU later on, because, as noted in the 
introduction, most of these theories operate with states being the exercisers of border control. 
Surveying the historical developments, important discussions such as the criticism of the EU 
regarding a democratic deficit (Schmidt 2004; Føllesdal 2006; Chryssochoou 2010), will also 
be investigated. 
The second part of the chapter will be a presentation of actual immigration policy 
developments. Here I distinguish between two policy paths of the EU, namely the “internal” 
and the “external”. Internal here is not meant as to only encompass migration between EU 
Member States, but rather, EU-migration regulation from “inside” and on EU territory. This 
includes the extension of the inner market with free movements of persons as well as the 
immigration regulation of the external border. The external migration regulation, meanwhile, 
does indeed transcend the territory of the Union. This includes the development of the Global 
Approach to Migration (GAM), and later the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 
(GAMM), both of which signify a new approach to migration management from the EU; in 
 15 
these instances, the EU, through initiatives such as Strategic Partnerships and Regional 
Protection Programmes (RPPs), as well as a comprehensive Neighbourhood Policy with the 
countries surrounding the Union territory, seeks influence on immigration outside its own 
physical borders. This is often referred to as externalization.  
 
The development of EU co-operation and integration on immigration  
Andrew Geddes (Geddes 2003: 131 ff) divides the development of the institutional setting 
around all EU-immigration policy areas into four distinct time-periods: 1) 1957-86: Minimal 
immigration policy involvement, 2) 1986-93: Informal intergovernmentalism, 3) 1993-99: 
Formal Intergovernmental Cooperation, 4) 1999; the post-Amsterdam period: 
Communitarisation. A quick glance at Geddes’ headings, reveals the overall direction 
cooperation on EU economic immigration policy has taken; going from little to no EU-
involvement to an actual Communitarisation in important areas of immigration signals a 
significant surrender of autonomy from the nation states to the EU-level in this policy area. It 
should be noted, however, that this is not true of every aspect of EU immigration policy. The 
assigning of citizenship, for instance, still resides with the Member States, along with other 
crucial issues the extent of which will be elaborated upon later. This development is also of 
interest because immigration policy is traditionally seen as the least likely policy area to 
undergo integration (Ette & Faist 2007: 4). Thus, looking at the development of EU economic 
immigration policy can help us better understand the current situation in regard to where the 
competencies of economic immigration policy lie. For now, let us look more closely into the 
different periods listed by Geddes, followed by a closer examination of the present situation. 
1957-93: From minimal immigration policy involvement to Informal 
intergovernmentalism 
The first two periods that Geddes describes span the years 1957 – 86 and 1986 – 93. Up until 
around 1986, immigration was not a formal EU-policy matter, but a national prerogative. From 
1986 and up until 1993, immigration policy crawled up on the agenda of the EU member states. 
While it still mainly took form as negotiations between member states, rather than official 
negotiations within the EU, this period saw the birth of the highly influential Schengen 
agreement. Incidentally, the development of the internal market followed a similar route, as the 
idea of the internal market is to provide free access of goods, services, capital and labour 
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between the member states. A big turning point came in 1986 with the adoption of the Single 
European Act (SEA). 
The Schengen Agreement started as an intergovernmental cooperation between the 
Benelux countries, France and Germany. It abolished border controls between the countries, 
substantially easing transits from country to country. While signed in 1985, it did not come into 
full effect until the mid 1990s. Other countries soon followed suit, eventually leading the 
Schengen to cover 13 different EU member States by 1997 (Geddes 2003: 131). Then, 
following the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty, it became a part of the EU acquis in 1999. 
Nevertheless, up until the mid-80’s immigration policy was not part of an important 
competence of the EU institutions. This period did however see important developments to the 
creation of the common market of EU. The idea about the single market can be traced all the 
way back to 1955-56 (Egan 2010: 259). It had three main elements: a) elimination of protective 
barriers to provide a normal standard of competition; b) limiting state intervention and 
monopolistic conditions; c) measures to prevent distortions of competition (ibid). The goal was 
to end up with a complete internal market that provided free access for goods, services, capital 
and labour. Later the Single European Act of 1986 gave a significant push in the completion of 
the internal market. The goal was to have it completed by 1992, thereby greatly improving the 
economic integration of EU member states. The single market was also seen as instrumental in 
eliminating the Union’s internal border controls, linking it to the adoption of the Schengen 
agreement (Uçarer 2010: 308). 
According to Geddes, 1986 was also the first year of the next period of immigration 
policy. This was characterized by ‘Informal Intergovernmentalism’, a period where cooperation 
between Member States in immigration matters increased, albeit purely on a non-supranational 
basis. There were several smaller projects and groups established in this period, but they all 
remained within the confines of international law that relied on ratifications in each member 
state. The most influential was arguably the June 1990 Dublin Convention, an asylum measure 
which introduced the concept of ‘safe third countries’, which made the return of asylum-seekers 
more efficient, while at the same time restricting asylum seekers from applying to more than 
one membership country. Later, in 1997 the Dublin Convention was ratified. Naturally, this 
period also saw the end of the Cold War and following reunification of Germany. The fall of the 
Iron Curtain had immense influence on the development of the EU and was quickly followed by 
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two Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) on the European Monetary Union (EMU) and on 
the political union itself, respectively. It was through these two IGCs that the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU, more popularly known as the Maastricht Treaty, emerged. (Phinnemore 
2010: 35). 
1993 – 1999: Formal Intergovernmental Cooperation 
With the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, a new foundation for the EU was 
introduced in the form of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), Common foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and Community pillars. Immigration policy fell under the auspice of the JHA 
pillar, along with Asylum policy, Family Reunification and Police and Judicial cooperation. 
Following a compromise between the member states, who preferred to have the JHA policy 
area brought into the supranational Community pillar, and those who were more reluctant to 
give up control to the European institutions, the JHA pillar became intergovernmental (Uçarer 
2010: 310). Intergovernmental in this regard meant that policy decisions required unanimity to 
be passed which meant that, even though the JHA policy area was now officially Part of the 
EU, most European Community institutions became marginalized in this field. This was 
especially true for the Commission, which only had a shared right of initiative10, but also for the 
European Parliament, whose role was restricted to consultation. Furthermore, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) was excluded from jurisdiction in JHA matters (ibid: 314). There were, 
however, minor exceptions to this, such as Article 100c that covered visa policies, which fell 
under the Community pillar. Aside from visa policy, obviously of great interest for many 
countries in regards to immigration, the issues that the Maastricht Treaty recognized as 
‘common interests’ between the member states was: 1) asylum policy; 2) External frontiers – 
particularly the crossing of these frontiers and the exercise of controls; 3) Immigration policy 
and policy regarding TCNs; 4) Conditions of entry and movement by nationals of third 
countries on the territory of member states; 5) Conditions of residence by nationals of third 
countries on the territory of Member States, including family reunion and access to 
employment; and 6) Combating unauthorized immigration, residence and work by TCNs 
(Geddes 2003: 135). Note that these ‘common interests’ are not the same as a common policy. 
Rather, these are areas where beneficial discussions and possibly future cooperation can take 
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 Except in judicial an police cooperation matters (Uçarer 2010: 314) 
 18 
place. The Maastricht Treaty in this sense carried on the intergovernmental nature of the 
migration policy area that had really kicked off in the 80s. The real innovation of the treaty, 
though, lay in the formal establishment of the EU, alongside an expansion of EC activities11 and 
the introduction of an EU Citizenship. Intergovernmentalism continued as before, albeit this 
time within the formalized pillar structure of the new European Union. The decision-making 
process of the JHA pillar was based on unanimity in the Council of Ministers, the most 
dominant actor in this period. Overall, the Maastricht Treaty gave birth to the JHA as a 
formalized and defined policy area constituting its very own pillar. 
Despite its name, Phinnemore contests that the Treaty on European Union should be seen 
as what is normally understood as a Union (Phinnemore 2010: 35). Because of the mix of 
supranational integration and intergovernmental cooperation, the TEU created a variety of 
approaches to decision making; different policy areas meant different decision making 
processes, sometimes involving the Community method (the first pillar) while at other times the 
approach was intergovernmental (second and third pillar). Exactly because of this 
differentiation and the corresponding lack of one political and legal entity with a coherent and 
uniform structure, the newly formed Union, seemed more like a hybrid of different forms of 
international organizations, drawing on both federalism as well as less binding ways of 
cooperation. 
As already noted, due to the intergovernmentalism in this area, firm decisions were 
typically hard to make, due to the confusion as to whether the competence for one specific 
policy area should rest within JHA pillar or the Community Pillar. This would change 
significantly with the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999. 
Post-Amsterdam Treaty (1999-) 
The last period Geddes considers is the post Amsterdam Treaty period, which he terms 
Communitarisation. The Amsterdam Treaty had a great effect on the area of JHA policy. 
Firstly, most of the content of the third pillar was moved to the first Community pillar, and was 
thereby communitarised (except for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters that 
remained in the intergovernmental third pillar). This meant that the Commission, the EP and the 
                                                           
11
 The EC was given new competences in the field of  education, culture, public health, consumer protection, 
trans-European networks, industry and development cooperation (Phinnemore 2010: 35). 
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ECJ would gain more influence, but only after a transition period of five years after the Treaty 
ratification (1999- 2004). After the transition period, the Commission would have the exclusive 
right of initiative, and the EP would gain more to say in the area of uniform visa rules and the 
procedures for issuing visas through the shift from consultation to codecision12 in this area. The 
ECJ would for the first time receive a mandate in the JHA area which allowed it to undertake 
preliminary rulings in policy areas falling within the first pillar, in response to requests by 
national courts. And finally, there was a step towards Qualified Majority Voting in the Council 
(Uçarer 2010: 315). The step towards QMV should be seen in the light of the failing political 
results in that period, mainly due to the unanimity-requirement of intergovernmentalism. These 
were problems, to the integrationist member states at least, that would only increase with the 
forthcoming enlargement to the east (Phinnemore 2010: 38). Moving towards QMW would 
then be an important measure in preventing decision-making paralysis. Secondly, the Schengen 
Agreement was incorporated into the new Title IV (which dealt with free movement, 
immigration and asylum) and was thereby also communitarised. The two non-Schengen 
Members UK and Ireland chose to remain outside of this agreement, together with the 
Schengen Member Denmark who chose to opt-out. 
As with all major political agreements, the Amsterdam Treaty was a product of 
compromise, which had several implications in regard to the end product, one of which was 
increased differentiation between the member states. In the final draft of the Treaty signed in 
1997, a flexibility mechanism promoting ‘closer cooperation’ between a willing majority of 
member states was introduced. The differentiation through the opt-outs from central policy 
areas of the United Kingdom13, Ireland and Denmark that was created with the Maastricht 
Treaty was then not just continued, but de facto increased - due to the expanding field of policy 
areas covered within the EU (Phinnemore 2010: 39). Because of the differentiation allowed, the 
treaty resulted in a Multi-speed Europe when it came to migration matters. The principle of 
subsidiarity added to the picture of a Europe with diverse immigration policies. It could be seen 
as further indication that the EU in many respects was far from supra-nationality and with 
                                                           
12
 Codecision (procedure): ‘A complicated three-stage decision-making procedure that involves both the EU 
Council and the European Parliament in making European Legislation, thereby enhancing the role of Parliament 
in the legislative process’ (Cini & Borragán 2010: 439). 
13
 Albeit differentiation was actually lessened within the social policy, as the opt-out of the United Kingdom was 
repealed (Phinnemore 2010: 39).  
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multi-speed integration progress. The Communitarisation of most of the JHA area (and all of 
JHA matters related to economic immigration) was a big step in transferring competence from 
the national level to the EU. Policy areas such as Irregular Migration, Visa Policy and Asylum 
would now fall under the same type of rules as those of the single market, as well as playing 
play an increasingly central role in the Union. 
Nice, Lisbon and beyond 
Since the Amsterdam Treaty, two Treaties have been adopted: The Nice Treaty coming into 
force in 2003; and, most recently, the Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009. The Nice Treaty 
made no attempts to regulate economic immigration matters, as it was mainly designed to pave 
the way for the oncoming enlargement of mainly Eastern European Countries - an enlargement 
that sprung from the 1993 European Council in Copenhagen as a response to the collapse of the 
eastern bloc. However, the actual enlargement itself did have an effect, as joining EU now 
required adherence to all of its accession requirements, including membership of the Schengen 
agreement, which were made part of the Acquis Communitaire with the Amsterdam Treaty. Of 
course, it also meant that Eastern Europeans now had significantly easier access to the rest of 
the Member States’ territory. The Lisbon Treaty, on the other hand, more directly affected the 
immigration policy area. The road to Lisbon, however, was hardly straightforward, being 
preceded by the failed amendment of the Constitutional Treaty. 
The Constitutional Treaty was designed to replace all existing treaties and thereby become 
the single constitutional document of the Union - the closest equivalent to a constitution for the 
Union so far. While a large part of the content of the Constitutional Treaty came from existing 
treaties there were still important changes, not least to the style and the overall structure of the 
Union, towards it being an actual constitution (including abolishment of the pillar-structure), as 
well as changes to the institutions and not least, the addition of the charter which had not 
previously been official Treaty text. More concretely also, the Constitutional Treaty changed 
the decision-making procedure adopting a joint decision-making procedure between the Council 
and the EP (replacing the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’) and extending the use of QMV. 
Furthermore, the Treaty also introduced a President for the European Council, as well as the 
new post of Union Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was specified that the Constitutional Treaty 
did not imply any accretion of power (Church & Phinnemore 2010: 53). With the Constitutional 
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Treaty it was furthermore explained what competences was exclusively with the EU, which 
were shared with the member states, and which lay entirely with the member states, albeit with 
the EU as supporter or coordinator. Economic immigration, as a part of the JHA area, was then 
clearly within the category of shared competences. All that remained was the ratification of the 
Treaty. 
The ratification process, however, ultimately proved too great a challenge. Albeit 
anticipated from the outset, referendums in France and the Netherlands rejected the treaty, 
effectively leaving the Constitutional Treaty dead (Church & Phinnemore 2010: 54). This 
outcome came despite the fact that, by June 2007, 18 of the 25 states had actually ratified the 
Treaty, some through referendums and others through national parliamentary votes. The 
remaining member states had either postponed its planned referendums or rejected the Treaty. 
Despite being declared dead, it was eventually revived and made into what was to be known as 
the Lisbon Treaty, which was signed in Lisbon on the 13th of December 2007 and ultimately 
ratified in late 2009. 
What, then, were the changes made from the Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty? 
Most of the content of the Constitutional Treaty was essentially preserved in the new Treaty. 
The major difference between the two Treaties is one of language - namely, the explicitly 
constitutional phrasing of the original treaty had largely been abandoned or transmuted in the 
Lisbon treaty (Church & Phinnemore 2010: 59). Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty did bring 
about some important changes, especially in the field of the legal framework and legislative 
procedures as, more areas of migration policy became subject to QMW/ codecision (Council of 
the European Union 2009).  Because the Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar structure of EU-
legislation, many migration policy areas went from the consultation procedure, with unanimity 
in the Council and only consultation of the EP to the ordinary legislative procedure with QMV 
in the Council and full co-legislative powers of the EP, formerly the co-decision procedure. 
Among these are the rules on short-stay visas and residence permits, legal immigration. Asylum 
policy and irregular immigration had already been moved (ibid). Interestingly enough, the 
Treaty of Lisbon also placed the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) ahead of The 
European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the 
Union’s most fundamental objectives (European Union 2013). Even though it does not change 
anything legally, the symbolic meaning of the change could still be seen as a nod towards the 
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enhanced priority JHA has within the EU (Uçarer 2010: 312). Finally, the Lisbon Treaty did 
also make changes with regard to improving the democratic legitimacy of the Union. By giving 
more power to both national and European parliaments, as well as introducing the citizen’s 
initiative14, more power was conferred directly onto the European citizenry. Figure 2.1 displays 
where the competence in immigration matters resides within the EU. 
                                                           
14
 The citizen’s initiative makes it possible for one million citizens from a number of member states to call on the 
commission to bring forward new policy proposals (European Commission 2013b). 
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Figure 2.1 Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation: from Trevi to Lisbon15 16 
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Let us briefly sum up what we have discussed so far and assess where we are today. The Lisbon 
Treaty’s greatest effect on the institutional setting of JHA’s immigration aspect is that 
immigration policy is now being governed by normal Union procedure instead of the special, 
intergovernmental procedures. Thus, the decision-making process has become more effective 
with the Treaty, slightly reducing the autonomy of the member states in some respects. It is 
equally true, however, that the Lisbon Treaty strengthens member state autonomy in other ways 
by giving them a right of secession from the union while underlining their equal membership 
status. Furthermore, there have been significant developments in the immigration policy area 
and immigration more broadly within the EU. This development was initiated outside of the 
EU, particularly with the Schengen agreement, before reaching the EU through the Maastricht 
Treaty. EU-integration was then significantly strengthened with the Amsterdam Treaty and, to 
some extent, the Lisbon Treaty. Perhaps the Maastricht Treaty had the greatest impact within 
this field, as it was with this Treaty that the field of immigration policy fell within EU 
competence. Yet, core competences of immigration policy, such as the assignment of 
citizenship, and most legal immigration channels still rest with the Member States. Before 
getting into the content of the EU developments on immigration policy, we have to consider the 
question of democracy in the EU, an issue crucial to understanding the level of control the 
citizenry/citizenries have over their institutions. 
 
Democratic deficit? 
A common critique of the EU is its (alleged) democratic deficit. Obviously, no polity or 
community can have a perfect form of democracy, and thus a certain degree of democratic 
deficit is unavoidable. However, the EU does appear more troubled than the standards it is 
typically held up to: those of its member states17. Perhaps equally troubling is the lack of 
scholarly agreement as to whether the EU actually has a democratic deficit or not. I will not 
attempt to resolve a matter as complicated as this. Instead I will limit myself to a short 
introduction of the issue’s central discussion, in itself a relevant factor in both of the normative 
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 Obviously, this claim may change depending on what member state you compare to, but at least compared to 
the more stable member states it seems to be the case. 
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immigration theories I will touch on later. A possible democratic deficit, then, is a factor 
complicating the direct translation of normative arguments about immigration policy formulated 
for democratic states to a more complex organization like the EU. For the following brief 
overview I have drawn on Dimitris Chryssochoou and Vivien Schmidt. 
Chryssochoou operates with two forms of critiques; an institutional critique, which is 
concerned with the institutional relationships in the EU and a demand to increase the different 
EU-institutions’ accountability. The second is a socio-psychological critique which is 
concerned with the question of a European demos and the (missing) European civic identity 
(Chryssochoou 2010: 379). The institutional perspective both criticises the limited power of the 
European Parliament, as well as the growing influence of the executive (ibid: 380). The first 
problem is that, while the EU throughout its history has seen an increasing integration in depth 
(the degree of power) as well as in width (the number of policy areas), the transfer of legislative 
power from national parliaments have not been matched by a similar degree of power in the 
European Parliament. As the European Parliament is the only institution with direct election in 
the EU, citizens have lost influence, resulting in a democratic deficit. The deficit is furthered by 
the use of QMV in the Council, as it allows for national parliaments to be outvoted. This is so 
even with the increased use of co-decision that followed with the Lisbon Treaty enhancing the 
power of the European Parliament, as this is generally not seen to fully compensate for the 
losses at the national level (ibid: 380). A separate criticism, related to the limited power of the 
European Parliament, centers on the increasing conferment of power to executive decision 
makers at EU-level compared to the parliamentarians (Chryssochoou 2010: 380; Føllesdal 
2006: 322). In this regard, the popular term “down in Brussels” is understood as referring to 
EU-bureaucrats and Commission members, rather than to the elected parliamentarians – which 
brings us to the very heart of the matter. The critique suggests that non-elected bodies possess 
too much power, which in turn increases demand for accountability of these institutions. 
According to this view, the European Commission is perhaps the best example of an 
undemocratic institution that, despite being comprised entirely of appointed, non-elected, 
nonetheless has substantive policy-making powers (Chryssochoou 2010: 381). Essentially, the 
Commission has been criticized for not living up to its (democratic) obligation of being 
sufficiently accountable to the European citizens it represents, even despite the increased power 
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of the EP to scrutinize the Commission. The result is that the EU is more characterized as ruled 
executively than popularly. 
The socio-psychological perspective has another focus than the institutional. In this view, 
what matters, according to Chryssochoou, is “[…] how Europeans think about themselves and 
the way that they view the communities to which they belong” (Chryssochoou 2010: 382). This 
is really a question about the absence of a functioning European civic identity; as long as 
Europe is a region of peoples instead of a people, there will always be a legitimacy deficit. This 
is because the critique builds on the assumption that:  
 
‘[D]emocracy, in the form of representative and responsible government, presupposes a 
popular infrastructure upon which certain basic properties, such as adherence to and 
acceptance of majority rule, apply in any given political community.’ (Chryssochoou 2010: 
382). 
 
Taken to the EU-level, this means that if the EU is to become a democratic polity it must refer 
to one transnational demos for legitimacy endowment. But if such a transnational demos does 
not exist, which is indeed the criticism, whilst at the same time governance to a considerable 
degree has been transposed to the transnational European level, the EU-polity is left without 
legitimacy. This is because democratic legitimacy lies in the members’: 
 
‘[…] active interest in the governance of the larger polity and who can direct their 
democratic claims to and via the central institutions. Thus it is the demos itself that endows 
the EU with legitimacy’ (Chryssochoou 2010: 382). 
 
According to Chryssochoou, European integration on the institutional plan (related to the first 
critique) must be followed by the emergence of a transnational demos as the European civic 
identity, if the EU wishes to retain its democratic legitimacy. This, however, does not 
necessitate the dissolution of national European demoi, or a transformation of these into a 
melting-pot type of society. The solution is more along the lines of a pluralist polity, in which 
the transnational authority – in this case, the EU - focuses its political purpose on the European 
civic demos (ibid: 382). In other words, Chryssochoou claims that the EU should have one 
demos comprised of many peoples. While this last part is more a proposed solution to the 
democratic deficit than an actual analysis, it does highlight one of the central questions of this 
debate: the relationship between the member states and the EU polity. There obviously exist 
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different institutions on each of their own two levels, but does it also entail that the EU should 
be viewed as several communities, a national and a regional (European)? The answer to this 
question seems to be a central issue for our normative immigration theories because the core 
subject of the majority of the theories we shall be examining, tends to be the political 
community. 
Picking up on this question, Vivien Schmidt argues that if one actually saw the EU as a 
regional state, or more accurately, a union of nation-states, complete with shared sovereignty, 
variable boundaries, composite identity and compound governance, the democratic deficit 
problems at the EU level would be minimal – albeit only to increase a democratic deficit at the 
national level (Schmidt 2004: 977). Framing (and possibly developing) the EU in this direction 
requires solutions to both the issue about sovereignty and identity. Take the case of sovereignty, 
for instance: in some cases member states have surrendered sovereignty to the EU such as with 
the EU Trade Commissioner and with Internal Activities in the context of the single market 
(ibid: 979); in other areas, such as defence policy, sovereignty still rests almost exclusively with 
each individual member state. Having a regional conception about sovereignty could then be 
said to already exist in some areas, such as with the single market and trade policies, but 
lagging behind in others, such as defence policy. Similarly, the issue of regional identity seems 
to be solved in some areas while being behind in others. If one looks at the question of 
belonging, citizens identify far more with their member state than with Europe (ibid: 981). Yet 
at the same time the EU has begun to create its own symbols, such as the European passport, the 
European flag, and the euro etc. To accept the EU as a regional state it has yet to develop in 
important ways despite being successful in others. 
That the EU is lagging behind in the creation of a common European identity can be 
attributed to two issues according to Schmidt: 
 
‘[F]irst, because it depends in large measure on its Member States to build a sense of 
Europe, given the lack of a common language, Europe-wide mass communication system, 
political leadership with Europe-wide election campaigns, and so forth; and second, 
because it is imagined mainly through the different lenses of national identity and 
purposes, with Europe represented in the public imagination portrayed differently by 
French leaders from the Germans, the British, or the Italians’ (Schmidt 2004: 981). 
 
A European identity on the same level as a national identity, then, seems almost impossible. 
Instead, Schmidt proposes that the EU identity be conceived in terms of ‘region-hood’ as 
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opposed to ‘nationhood’, thereby constructing a European ‘imagined political community’ 
(Schmidt 2004: 982). 
Further complicating matters, however, are the variable boundaries of the EU. Because of 
the ever changing territoriality of the EU, with its many and ongoing enlargements, the demos 
keeps changing and, further yet, the expansion appears to have no clear end in view (ibid: 980). 
But perhaps even more confusing is the different pace of integration between the member 
states. Thus, for instance, memberships of the euro and to the Schengen groups respectively 
vary because some member states have chosen to opt-out of these agreements. If the EU is truly 
to be considered as one community, how should governance be understood when integration is 
multi-speed? 
In this small digression we have briefly introduced some of the further challenges that the 
topic of democracy at the EU level can pose for our normative immigration theories - a 
discussion that will be picked up on in subsequent discussions of each theory. For now, though, 
let us turn to the actual EU policies of economic immigration. 
 
The Union’s policy developments on immigration 
In the introduction of this chapter I differentiated between two “policy-paths” in EU 
immigration policy. The internal path was characterized by EU immigration policy regulation 
within the EU-area; political developments such as the Schengen agreement, the external border 
control, as well as policies designed to attract immigrants considered as desired to the EU, are 
all examples that follow this path. The logic of the internal path then is largely that of 
“traditional” immigration regulation, namely to focus on measures for ones own territory. Note 
that policies which have an indirect effect outside of EU territory is still considered as 
belonging to the Internal path, as long as it only regulates directly inside EU member state 
territory. Loosening or tightening the physical border control obviously has an effect outside 
EU territory, as it renders would-be immigrants’ possibilities to enter into EU-territory either 
easier or harder. Likewise, extending non-EU citizens’ rights and possibilities in the EU, or 
loosening the membership border, also makes travel to EU more attractive and in this respect 
arguably has an effect outside EU-territory. Yet these are both examples of the Internal path 
because they mainly concern regulation of the EU landscape. 
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In contrast, the External path seeks to transcend this logic, as its main concerns are with 
migration management directly on non-EU member state territory, influencing the ‘root causes’ 
of immigration in sending countries, as well as making neighbouring countries adopt stricter 
immigration measures and be more willing to accept returnees. In this path, usually traced back 
to the Tampere European Council in 1999 and the so-called ‘comprehensive approach’ 
launched there, EU-policy agreements can overall be described as directly affecting non-EU 
countries by projecting EU impact onto them. This is achieved by influencing non-EU states’ 
governments into accepting policy prescriptions made by the EU, such as return agreements. 
But the External path also covers European (physical) border control operations carried out in 
international high seas and neighbouring territories. There are several examples of these types 
of operations carried out by the European Border Agency, Frontex18. Following this logic, 
policies directed outside of EU member state territory, but with an indirect impact on EU or its 
member states, are still considered as part of the External path. 
These two paths should only be understood as analytical differentiations. When you look 
at concrete EU documents, oftentimes the policies are a mix of the different paths. The reason 
that I have chosen to distinguish between them here is because to do so fits well with the way 
traditional normative immigration theories discuss the justification of border control. For this 
reason, the historical developments of the concrete EU-immigration policies will be presented 
chronologically, rather than divided between the different paths. For the benefit of the reader, 
the exact path discussed will be specified throughout. While reading this section bear in mind 
that focus is still with EU-policy only, and not with concrete national examples. 
The early years of the EU-immigration policy: The post-Maastricht and –
Amsterdam period 
The inclusion of the JHA policy area into the EU with the enforcement of the Maastricht Treaty 
sparked the beginning of formalised EU-immigration policies. It held great significance for the 
post Maastricht immigration policy development, building on the growing success of the 
Schengen agreement. It was a period that was characterized by decision-making through the 
Council of Ministers, implying that decisions had to be reached by unanimity. This led to the 
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 For recent examples see for instance the issues of Quarterly Frontex Risk Analysis (FRAN). Oftentimes these 
operations are carried out as joint operations between Frontex and sending countries or Member States and 
Sending Countries. 
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period between 1993 and 1999 being distinguished by a proliferation of non-binding measures 
of immigration and asylum policy (Geddes 2003: 136). While not as extensive as some of the 
integrationists would have liked, compared to pre-Maastricht standards, this was a significant 
development. In regard to immigration, the Member States began to focus on regulation 
applying to Third Country Nationals (TCNs) entering the Union territory, such as common rules 
for employment and education. Furthermore, the Council also sought to create common rules 
for the expulsion of TCNs, together with a common format for bilateral readmission agreements 
(Uçarer 2010: 316). Even though policy measures may have been mostly concerned with 
control and the restriction of immigrants (Bendel 2007: 34; Geddes 2003: 143), a migrant 
inclusion agenda could also be identified; it was characterized by improving EU citizenship 
rights for TCNs and enhancing anti-discrimination provisions, as well as the treatment of 
asylum-seekers, so that the EU-regulation would be in accordance with international standards. 
The Commission issued two comprehensive Directives, one on equal treatment and one on 
employment/occupation, which together sought to tackle both direct and indirect discrimination, 
thereby improving the working conditions for TCNs in the EU area. Furthermore, with the 
Tampere Conclusions in 1999, the Commission recognized the need to open up for some 
measure of immigration, in part as a requirement to enter into global competition, as well as a 
means of mitigating the demographic challenges of a European population in decline. All of the 
measures described so far fit into the internal policy path because they seek to regulate on EU-
territory. 
In another migration policy strand, the membership of the Schengen agreement, which 
had yet to become official EU regulation during the first half of the 90’s, rose to 13 EU Member 
States in 1997. The Schengen agreement had a great effect on the EU area, even before it was 
incorporated into the EU acquis, because it both meant the removal of controls on persons at the 
internal borders together with the development of common entry policies for the Member 
States’ collective territory - the external border, including common visas to immigrants. Central 
to Schengen was, as earlier noted, that an area without internal frontiers, within which people 
could move freely, required stronger external borders and improved security measures (Kleist 
2011: 2). This concordance of, on the one hand, opening up the internal borders between the 
Schengen members, while at the same time tightening the members’ external border control, 
would later become a model for a substantial part of the immigration policy of the Union 
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(Sterkx 2008: 118). A good example of this is the Amsterdam Treaty which, by creating an 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice19 (Article I-42) emphasized the push for stronger 
management of the external borders as the process of removing internal borders went on. The 
next step in this control aspect of immigration policy arrived with the improvement of the 
Schengen system and with the adoption of the Hague Programme. 
In the Schengen system there was already a comprehensive database – the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) – for the exchange of information between the member states on 
different categories of individuals and property. Building on this, as well as some of the 
progress made by the Tampere European Council, such as plans to combat irregular 
immigration and regulate the management of external borders, the Hague Programme of 200420 
introduced an integrated border management system and visa policy, including the Visa 
Information System (VIS) database, as well as a call for a system of burden sharing21. And to 
make up for the further abolition of internal, physical border controls, another call for 
strengthening the external, physical border control was made by the European Council – 
specifically by creating a European External Border Agency later be known as Frontex. By May 
1 2008, 25 Countries had either signed or opted in on the Schengen agreement. 22 of these were 
Member States, along with non-members Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. Furthermore, two 
EU countries, The UK and Ireland, while not members of the Schengen system, can opt-in on 
an issue-by-issue basis. On the 28’th of February 2008 a protocol on the participation of 
Liechtenstein in the Schengen area was signed, making them a future member. The list of 
Schengen members are concluded with the inclusion of Croatia into the EU in 2013. 
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 Covering immigration policy, asylum policy, police cooperation, and judicial cooperation 
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 Adopted at the November 2004 Brussels European Council 
21
 The VIS stores biometric data of visa applicants, such as fingerprints and digital pictures and shares this 
information  
between the Member States. 
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Figure XX: The Schengen Area 2011 (Gibney, Anthony & Flaherty LLP; Oct. 1, 2013) 
 
 
On the surface, the Hague Programme represented a clear shift in focus towards a securitized 
conception of migration, compared to the Tampere Conclusions. The 9/11 terror-attacks in US, 
as well as the March 2004 Madrid terror-attack greatly contributed to this priority shift towards 
a security and control centred approach to migration (Bendel 2007: 36). And while the 
preceding Tampere Programme put great focus on actually combining the developmental 
perspective, particularly addressing the ‘root causes of migration’ along with the immigration 
control perspective through the ‘comprehensive approach’, emphasis in The Hague Programme 
leaned more heavily towards focusing on the control aspects. Evidence of this can be found in 
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Steven Sterkx’ findings about the actual implementation of the Tampere Conclusions; referring 
to the budget of respectively the migration management (47.34 % total) and that of 
development (13.01% total), Sterkx argues that the actual implementation of the Tampere 
conclusions reveals that the focus in practical reality has been on policy issues such as, 
readmission, return and the fight against illegal immigration, instead of development and 
mobility: 
 
‘Concrete measures […] are concerned with the dissuasion at the source – in countries of 
origin and transit – and restriction of access to the union’ (Sterkx 2008: 131). 
 
While political priorities cannot be explained be budgetary spending alone, it does give some 
indication about what was actually implemented in the years following Tampere. The 
Commission at this point saw the need for an improved SIS22, and therefore launched the SIS II 
project and with the plans to create the European External Border Agency, with the possibility 
of creating a European System of Border Guards, the control agenda of immigration policy was 
seemingly solidified (Council of the European Union 2013). In 2005, incidents in the two 
Spanish exclaves Ceuta and Melilla would, however, once again push the inclusion agenda 
forward, incidents where several hundreds of African migrants tried to jump the fences of the 
two Spanish exclaves located at the northern part of Morocco, resulting in the deaths of several 
migrants and the severe injury of many more. These incidents proved highly influential in 
challenging the predominant focus on the security and control aspects of migration with a call 
for also going to the ‘root causes’ thereby enhancing development and economic cooperation 
with so called ‘sending countries’ (Bendel 2007: 37). These events combined made migration 
policy one of the EU’s top political priorities.  
Up to this point, the Union’s Internal path of immigration policy best describes the 
developments in this area. Still, one could argue that the 2004 and 2007 Eastern enlargements 
could be seen as following the External path, seeing as how post-Nice Treaty accession 
countries would have to live up to a whole set of requirements, such as the JHA acquis incl. 
Schengen, as well as improve their physical border controls. In the time between a country’s 
candidacy and its actual accession, this influence corresponds to the characteristics of the 
External path, as it entails that the EU project its policies outwards, thereby “externalising” 
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important immigration policy priorities. This does however betray a degree of artifice, as the 
object of being a candidate country includes becoming a member, and in effect a part of the 
collective EU-territory. Furthermore, the concept of Regional Protection Programmes (RPP’s)23 
was introduced in 2004 in the Commission Communication “Improving Access to Durable 
Solutions” (European Commission 2004). RPP’s are certainly to be considered part of the 
External path, because they operate directly on non-EU territory, so it would be incorrect to 
only emphasize the Internal and the Security path, even though these would later be further 
prioritized. 
In summation, the Tampere Programme of 1999 and the Hague Programme of 2004 have 
operated mostly within the Internal path, albeit with some initiatives falling under the External 
path. Furthermore, the ‘comprehensive approach’ has been marginalized in comparison with the 
control aspects of the union’s immigration policy. This imbalance would be lessened by the 
follow up to the Hague Programme: the Stockholm Programme of December 2009. 
The Stockholm Programme and the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility  
The current strategy on immigration and asylum matters was formulated in the 2009 Stockholm 
Programme, the successor to The Hague Programme. We will be interrogating the nature of this 
programme more closely than the preceding two, as it covers the most relevant elements of the 
immigration policy progress in EU legislation today. Furthermore, I will strive to explicitly 
point out which policies adhere to the Internal and which belong to the External paths of 
immigration policy. I have marked this in brackets so as to gain an easy overview of my 
grouping. As this dichotomy is my own conceptualization, certain policies will be difficult to fit 
into this division. Some policies will therefore appear to adhere to both paths, which, for our 
purposes of using the path distinction to paint a larger picture, hardly pose a problem. 
The Stockholm Programme was approved in December 2009 by the Council, and is valid 
for the period 2010 - 2014. According to the JHA Council, the programme had been pre-empted 
by progress made in both the Internal and External aspects of the migration policy areas, such 
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 The goal of a Regional Protection Programme is: ‘Regional Protection Programmes should enhance the 
capacity of areas close to regions of origin to protect refugees. The aim should be to create the conditions for one 
of the three Durable Solutions to take place – repatriation, local integration or resettlement’ (European 
Commission 2005). Usually, this is done through various forms of enhancing the protection capacity of the region, 
either with local governments or through partnership with the UNHCR (ibid). 
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as the removal of internal borders of the Schengen Area (Internal path), increased coherence in 
the management of the external border (Internal path), development of dialogues and 
partnerships with third countries (External path) and progress in the establishment of the 
Common European Asylum System (Internal path). Additionally, in the period leading up the 
Stockholm Programme’s approval, European agencies such as the Fundamental Rights Agency 
(Internal path) and Frontex (Internal and External path) had been successfully created (Council 
of the European Union 2009a: 2). Herein we find the link to the Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility (GAMM). The GAMM is the Commission’s implementation the Stockholm 
Programme’s principles related to legal migration, irregular migration, asylum matters and the 
development in non-EU countries. It is very loyal to the priorities of the Stockholm Programme, 
and its policy proposals represent examples of both the Internal and External paths. The 
GAMM is grounded on four pillars that reflect the priorities: 1) Organizing and facilitating legal 
migration and mobility; 2) Preventing and reducing irregular migration and trafficking in 
human beings; 3) Promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of 
asylum policy; 4) Maximizing the development impact of migration and mobility. 
In the first pillar the overall object is to improve legal migration and mobility to and from 
EU with partnership countries. This is achieved through a combination of harmonising EU 
legislation on long-term residents, family-reunification, students, researchers and highly 
qualified people (Internal path), as well as granting equal rights to non-EU nationals through the 
Single Permit Directive (European Commission 2011: 12) (Internal path). Part of these rights, 
specifically the right to social security, were extended to cover non-EU nationals from the 
countries of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and Israel (ibid: 13). Furthermore, improving Integration of non-EU nationals (Internal path), as 
well as the common EU-visa policy (Internal and External paths), take priority in this pillar. 
Lastly, Migration and Mobility Resource Centres are to be established in partner countries 
(External path) to improve relevant information to would-be legal immigrants. The overall 
concern with these initiatives is the improvement of economic gains for both EU-Member 
States and non-EU partnership countries. This first pillar regarding legal migration and mobility 
follows the logic of the Internal path by and large. 
The second pillar of GAMM covers the policies towards irregular immigrants and 
trafficked persons, as well as the actual traffickers. The different elements that comprise it are: a 
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transfer of skills, capacity and resources to partners of EU-Member States, in order to combat 
trafficking as well as irregular migration (External path); strengthening the integrated border 
management (Internal path); ensuring that the Directives on Return and Employer Sanctions 
works efficiently (External and Internal path); extending the Biometric travel documents24 offer 
to “frequent travelers” coming from outside EU (Internal path); linking readmission agreements 
to VISA facilitation agreements (Internal and External paths); and having an integrated view of 
how to prevent Trafficking in Human Beings (Internal and External paths). The second pillar 
then, includes both security aspects and covers both policies regarding legal and irregular 
migration. Furthermore, it proposes policies that adhere both to the Internal and the External 
policy path. 
The third pillar mainly focuses on asylum and resettlement. Special emphasis is placed on 
enhancing non-EU countries’ asylum capacity and strengthening their asylum systems. It 
consists of projects which aim at: Strengthening the Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs) 
already in place and establishing new ones making RPPs the key instrument for this pillar 
(External path); increasing the cooperation with relevant non-EU countries to strengthen their 
asylum systems and national asylum legislation (External path); the rights of stateless persons 
and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (External path); extending the work of the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) to asylum capacity building in non-EU countries (External 
path); and preparing a Joint EU Resettlement Programme to increase resettlement in Europe 
(Internal path). While this pillar contains both Internal and External path elements, the External 
elements by far eclipse the Internal. The overall logic at play here is that help should be given 
locally where the problems have evolved. 
The fourth pillar is mainly about problems with development and opportunities linked to 
both migration of South-North and South-South, i.e. Inter- and intra-regional migration. It 
includes: promoting the WHO code of practice on the international recruitment of health 
personnel (Internal and External paths) and monitoring application of the EU-Blue Card 
Directive to mitigate “brain drain” (Internal path); assistance to partner countries to identify 
bona fide recruiters in order to empower migrants, notably with a view to facilitating circular 
migration (Internal and External paths); and trying to include diaspora communities better in the 
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other identificatory information.  
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process. This fourth pillar is very much about the constant exchange of migrants between EU-
Member States and Non-EU States, and so most initiatives contains an element of both the 
External and Internal paths. The pillar is mainly concerned with the interplay of migrants 
moving between these two territories and tackling problems at the source i.e sending countries. 
In this way, the fourth pillar dovetails back into the Tampere Programme. 
So these are the goals that the Commission hopes to accomplish through the GAMM. 
Looking at the period from 1999 and up until the present day, it is evident that policy priorities 
with the unfolding of crucial, already historical, events like the 9/11 terror-attacks in USA as 
well as the 2004 Madrid terror attacks, alongside the Ceuta and Melilla incidents in 2005, have 
shifted back and forth. But the demographic changes in the Union have also played a crucial 
role in shaping the objectives of the union’s immigration policy objectives. The Union both has 
the goal of attracting wanted immigrants, as well as restricting unwanted immigrants, and the 
GAMM is an attempt to encompass both of these aims. It aims to do so by regulation working 
inside its own borders, the Internal Path, as well as influencing regulation outside its own 
borders, the External Path.  
 
Chapter summary: Who has the right to control migration regulation in the 
EU?  
Answering the question about who controls immigration is no simple task. In fact, the best we 
can come up with appears to be something along the lines of saying that the right to control 
immigration is placed somewhere between the Member States and the EU. Europeanization and 
Communitarization changes the context where immigration control is being decided and 
enforced, while the notion of immigration control itself is also changing, due to increasing focus 
on externalisation. Perhaps the best way of showing the conflict is by two different quotes from 
Geddes, each representing two opposite views of how the EU development is to be interpreted: 
 
‘The EU represents the Erosion of core nation state functions with regards to border control 
and the mediation of membership and belonging’ (Geddes 2003: 127) 
 
‘[…] [T]he development of EU immigration and asylum co-operation and integration is a 
reassertion of control capacity and as such strengthens rather than weakens state 
sovereignty’ (Geddes 2003: 127) 
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So while it remains unclear as to exactly which conclusions we can draw regarding the right of 
immigration control, we can safely conclude that the matter in itself is unclear. What is 
interesting for us, then, is how this uncertainty affects the normative immigration theories we 
are discussing. If what we are looking at as right-bearers is a broadly defined community, and 
the EU in this way can be seen as one big community, then perhaps the question about the 
communitarisation of competencies is just a practical problem. But what if the core subject of 
the right to control immigration is a nation state? The increased use of QMV could then be said 
to seriously affect the rights of that nation state, as it allows for a minority of states to be 
outvoted, thereby losing control of their immigration. These questions, and others related to it, 
will be discussed in the following chapters. 
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Liberal Nationalism 
Liberal Nationalism (LN) is a contemporary approach to the question of states’ rights to control 
their own borders. David Miller is one of the leading proponents of this view, and I will 
primarily discuss his book National Responsibility and Global justice from 2007, his most 
recent monograph25. 
Miller touches upon the normative claim of whether states do in fact have territorial 
rights, as well as on what follows from this in terms of the state’s right to control immigration26. 
Broadly speaking, Miller argues that, on the one hand, immigrants generally cannot claim to 
have a human right to cross national boundaries, i.e. a right to migration27; On the other hand, 
we have the states who, as representatives of the people, may in fact establish territorial rights 
over a given territory. The overall justification for border control draws on these insights, 
combined with the role played by a political community that has a shared sense of national 
identity, as well as the need for a democratic decision making system. 
We start out with the positive arguments for border control, including how a political 
community can establish territorial rights. We shall then move on to Miller’s way of 
conceptualizing what he defines as Basic Human Rights, as well as the issue of whether there is 
such a thing as a general “right to migration”. Finally, I shall discuss the notions of national 
identity and democracy in conjunction with territorial rights as part of an assessment of how 
well LN can be applied to the EU-level. 
 
The case for border control 
For a state to determine who can and who cannot be admitted to its territory, it needs to justify 
its border control. Persons living in other parts of the world may have an interest in migrating to 
another country, and to deny them this requires good reasons – especially given that obtaining 
citizenship in a well-functioning state may improve ones opportunities in life considerably. If a 
state wishes to defend its right to keep people off its territory, it needs first to justify why states 
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 Consequently, when I refer to LN in this chapter it refers to David Millers version of the view 
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 Miller also touches upon the special needs of refugees, but essentially he sees this question as an exception to 
the general rule. This too will be touched upon later on in the chapter. 
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 The right to migration is used only to refer to the right to cross borders which is not equal to the right to 
freedom of movement, as this will be used to signify a general right to move around, including inside a country’s 
borders. 
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have such a strong claim on monopoly of political authority throughout the territory it controls. 
This is what we will come to refer to as “the efficiency argument”. Secondly, it will need to 
show that it has the right to a particular territory. This argument will be referred to as “the 
occupancy – transformation argument”. After having examined these two arguments, we will 
consider some objections that can be made against them. 
The justification for monopoly of political authority (the efficiency argument) 
Miller is principally interested in states, so the justification for the monopoly of political 
authority over a given territory essentially translates into the arguments for how and why the 
state, as a representative of the people it governs, has the right to apply law over specific issues 
of public policy in a given territorial area. The argument can be explained as follows: 
 
‘[I]magine two communities intermingled on the same territory, each subject to a different 
political authority responsible for law enforcement etc. Assume that members of the two 
communities are generally well disposed to one another. It would, nonetheless, be very 
difficult for their members to cooperate with one another, or to solve all kinds of collective 
problems such as where to build roads, or how to control environmental pollution. Even 
simple person-to-person dealings – for example, disputes over property, contracts and 
personal injury – would be hard to conduct until it was agreed whose law should govern 
them’ (Miller 2007: 215). 
 
Miller here is trying to prove a general argument for political authority over territory. This 
argument covers all public policy issues – from health care to infrastructure, education etc. - 
and therefore goes beyond the mere question about immigration laws and rights. Essential to the 
argument, and hence the justification, is that states cannot carry out these functions effectively, 
‘unless the state has authority over a determinate territory’ (Miller 2007: 214). The authority to 
carry out the functions of a modern state is so embedded in the territory, that they cannot be 
separated in any meaningful way. The alternative scenario of having different governments 
competing over the authority of territory would render many human activities, as well as public 
policies, near impossible to conduct. If you take the example of economic activity, then being 
subject to the same laws regarding trade and contracts is essential to successful businesses. 
Likewise, in regards to the state’s activities, the planning of infrastructure and environmental 
protection seems almost impossible without the exclusive right to a territory. Therefore, the 
benefits of such a division is that a monopolizing authority enables people in a territory to know 
to which laws they are subjected, and thus can engage in activities which would otherwise be 
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hard or even impossible. Miller also considers whether or not this monopoly of political 
authority can be only unitary or whether a multilayered authority might also work. To him, 
what is required to make the justification work is a clear-cut division of law-making and other 
powers. A division of authority may well work as long as there is no confusion as to which 
authority governs which area. This entails that federalist and decentralized governments can 
also be encompassed by the argument (ibid: 214). 
As may be apparent, the justification for monopolizing political authority over territory is 
essentially utilitarian: monopoly of political authority is the best way of providing an efficient 
way for the people to know which rules to follow and for the political authority to best carry out 
its functions. Competing claims of authority, meanwhile, makes cooperation unreasonably 
difficult. The argument is then that the monopoly is needed because it ultimately provides the 
greatest benefits for the highest number of people. A point worth noting in this regard is that, 
presumably, this efficiency argument gives way to other forms of organizing authority, in the 
off chance that a more beneficial scheme could emerge. The claim is simply that, of all the 
systems we know, and for the reasons described above, a monopoly of political authority, 
multilayered or unitary, is the best and most efficient way of organizing authority. For this 
reason, we shall refer to it as “the efficiency argument”. 
The consequence of this view, in regard to migration, is that every person present on the 
territory where a state has authority is subject to the laws of that state (Miller 2007: 215). A 
citizen of another country, for instance, cannot claim that she is subject only to the laws of her 
home country, while present on another state’s territory. Authority follows territory, an 
inescapable fact when on another state’s territory. But authority also includes the right to 
control who falls within its scope and, in effect, the ability to expel persons from their territory 
(ibid: 216). There can, however, be reasons of justice why this territorial right is limited; if not 
expelling certain people, or rather, if allowing them entry is required to respect their human 
rights, the state has a duty to not exclude such persons (a topic which we will come back to later 
on in the chapter). All in all, this efficiency argument shows that states are justified in having 
territorial rights. However, it does not justify the existence of any particular state – why not, for 
instance, replace it with a new one that is equally efficient? The assertion, that particular 
existing historical states have territorial rights and that they have a right to control migration, 
requires its own justification. 
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Establishing particular territorial rights (the Occupancy – Transformation 
argument) 
The “Traditional view” in international law on the matter of state authority is, according to 
Miller, that the state’s exercise of authority over a particular territory must be efficient, securing 
the interests of those within the territory, including human rights and preserving social order 
(Miller 2007: 216-17). Claims of territorial authority cannot be disputed as long as a state lives 
up to these requirements. This entails that, in the Traditional View, de facto boundaries of 
effectively functioning states are considered sacrosanct and not to be challenged; if they were, 
most of today’s existing borders would be open for dispute, leaving the system in chaos. Miller 
is not satisfied with this explanation; according to him, boundaries have been changed 
throughout history for various reasons, such as wars, political compromises, independence 
revolutions and so forth. Why were these former boundaries not the “right” ones? Because the 
Traditional View does not offer a solution to how borders can be changed throughout time – it 
proposes simply to keep the borders of present day – the inherent justification for borders in the 
approach is essentially arbitrary. Therefore, Miller takes on another approach; his solution to 
the problem is found in what we shall call the “occupancy – transformation argument”. 
For Miller, ‘states can only claim territorial rights as representatives of the peoples that 
they govern’ (Miller 2007: 217). Particular territorial right belongs to the people collectively28, 
and the borders as well as the rights can, in principle, change. To explain his position, he uses 
the example of a nation, which over a long period of time occupies and transforms a piece of 
territory, maintaining a hold on that territory into the present. According to Miller, this has a 
number of consequences, which he sums up as: a) Adaptation and Cultivation; b) Added value; 
and c) The Symbolic Significance of national territory. 
a) When a nation occupies a territory, it results in both adaptation and cultivation of the 
territory. On the one hand, the culture of the people will have to adapt to the territory, i.e. the 
possibilities the natural environment provides for the people in question – is it suitable for 
agriculture, fishing etc.. How the territory is laid out, has a great impact on the possibilities of 
the people. On the other hand, the territory will simultaneously be cultivated by those same 
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 It should be noted here that Miller operates with several different agency perspectives. While most scholars will 
accept an agency perspective at the individual level, Miller also operates with an agency perspective at the 
collective level, i.e. communities of people (Miller 2007: 7). This means that duties and responsibility, depending 
on the case, can either be placed on the individual or the collective agent. 
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people, and thereby shaped and modified to fit the needs of its inhabitants; irrigation systems 
might be required in order to provide enough water to the fields, towns and cities are built, 
roads are cut through the landscape etc. It will eventually become ‘the people’s home’ (ibid: 
218), a home where the cultivation is both shaped by the specific territory as well as the people 
inhabiting it. 
b) According to Miller, “a)” entails that the nation has a legitimate claim to the enhanced 
value of the territory, following the cultivation of it by the people. This builds on an idea of 
inherited responsibility29 as a form of outcome responsibility30; in the same way a nation can 
inherit responsibility for past injustices, a nation can inherit the benefit of the work created by 
past members of the nation. And because the added value is embedded in the territory, the 
nation cannot retain that value without the rights to the territory (ibid: 218). 
c) A last consequence of the occupation and transformation concerns the symbolic 
significance of national territory. The cultivation of the territory does not only grant an added 
value in an economic sense, but also endows the territory with meaning, i.e. monuments, 
significant historical events, poems, songs etc., that in some way depict or relate to the different 
places and landscapes. A nation with rights over its territory can also make its own choices 
about how to manage these special sites of significance (ibid: 219). This, of course, also 
provides great value to the people, albeit in a different way than the economic entitlements of 
the added value consequence. 
Miller’s argument for why particular states can have territorial rights over particular 
territories – the transformation, a), and its consequences, b and c combined – shall henceforth 
be referred to as the “Occupancy – Transformation argument”. There are a couple of important 
objections to this argument which shall be considered below. 
Objections to the Occupancy – Transformation argument 
Miller considers two central objections to his account of how the Occupancy – Transformation 
argument establishes particular territorial rights. The first concerns the possibility of unjust 
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 Miller has a lengthy argument in chapter 6 for how nations can inherit responsibility, but it will be too much to 
go into here in detail as it is not of key relevance to our topic. 
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 ‘[…] the idea that where we can identify A as the agent who has produced a certain outcome O, we have reason 
to let A enjoy the benefits or suffer the harms associated with O, and at the same time indemnify others who have 
been damaged by O’ (Miller 2007: 163). 
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appropriation of land; the second objection questions whether the state’s right to restrict 
immigration is absolute. 
Firstly, some argue that the Occupancy – Transformation argument can only be feasible, if 
the occupants of a certain territory already had a right to that land in the first place (Miller 2007: 
219). So the argument does not hold if, for instance, the current occupants somewhere in turn 
had taken the territory through the expulsion of past occupants. In that case, only the original 
landowners hold a legitimate claim to a territory. Their objection, then, is that Miller’s view on 
territorial rights allow too much, including conquests and other unjust means of appropriating 
land. 
Miller acknowledges this objection to a certain extent, as his view will indeed in some 
cases allow descendants of past conquerors to retain territorial rights over a given territory 
(Miller 2007: 220). Miller, however, stresses the fact that even though his view may allow some 
cases of injustice, the alternative does not seem any more promising. As noted earlier, very few 
modern states would be able to live up to this demand, thus, following this path would, 
according to Miller, lead to widespread international chaos and confusion involving all kinds of 
secession, arbitrary annexations and so forth. The Occupancy – Transformation argument is to 
be preferred, according to Miller, because it is flexible; it does not accept a sacrosanct nature of 
present day borders, but on the contrary allows these to be changed over time, through the 
occupancy and transformation by a given nation. 
Another popular objection that could be made against the Occupancy –Transformation 
approach, meanwhile, has to do with the analogy between territorial rights and private property 
rights (Miller 2007: 220). Despite usual concession that there is a general right to private 
property, this right may sometimes be trumped by the urgent needs of others – such as Miller’s 
example of a starving man feeding himself from someone else’s crops without permission 
(ibid). According to this objection, even strong defenders of private property recognize special 
circumstances under which these rights must be overridden by urgent human needs. The 
analogy to territorial rights is relatively straightforward if you consider an immigrant in need of 
subsistence encroaching on the territory of a foreign country. Can this immigrant legitimately 
claim a right to enter the state’s territory? 
Miller does concede that there can be situations wherein the only way of protecting 
immigrants is by granting them admission, but he states that it only applies when the immigrant 
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in question is in need of basic human rights. Two qualifications to this claim must be made to 
understand it properly. First off, even though it can be the case as above, that a nation has a 
responsibility to protect an immigrant by granting him access to its territory, it does not mean 
the immigrant in need can enter into the state of his own choosing. As long as there are a 
number of other states able to provide for him, the immigrant does not have a right to freely 
choose entry to whichever state of his or her liking. Able states have a remedial responsibility 
towards immigrants in need, but this duty does not trump their right to border control (Miller 
2007: 221). An immigrant in need may just as well be cared for in another country than his first 
preference; he may even be cared for in another way, for instance by a special aiding program 
in his home country. The consequence is that a state claiming legitimate authority over a 
territory cannot ‘ethically speaking, defend its boundaries and do nothing else in a world where 
human rights are in many places insecure’ (ibid: 221). There are limits to territorial rights, but 
immigrants’ rights do not make these obsolete; rather they are an exception – or more likely – 
an addition to the rule of territorial authority. Part of the reason you can be justified in having 
this authority is that you take reasonable steps to protect the human rights of person affected 
negatively by the border. 
Secondly, we need to distinguish between immigrants in need who, by invoking basic 
human rights, move to a new country by their own volition, and immigrants in urgent need, 
arriving starved and weakened at the shore of a particular state. In the latter case, there is only 
the particular receiving country in question who, offhand, can provide the care needed in this 
instance, entailing that it has a duty to protect the person in need. In the former case – that of an 
immigrant migrating by his own free will – the number of recipient countries is greater, making 
it harder to assign a direct duty to any one of them. Furthermore, in both cases, the duty is 
solely grounded in a remedial responsibility, thereby not granting the immigrant any permanent 
right to stay. Whether the best way of helping is by actually granting entry, and perhaps even 
citizenship, to the person in need, or whether it is more efficient to help the person in need at 
the place where that person is currently residing, depend on the actual situation. I shall say a 
little more about assigning responsibility, and how it relates to different kinds of human rights 
in the following section. 
Summarising this section, we have seen that states have the right to control their borders 
because a monopoly of authority is the most efficient way of organizing a society. To have 
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authority in this regard includes both having authority over the territory where it applies as well 
as the right to decide who falls within its scope. This is the general border control argument in 
Millers configuration of LN. Furthermore, the occupancy–transformation argument justifies 
why particular states have the right to a particular territory, along with the added economic and 
cultural value embedded in the territory, and accounts for how borders can change through time, 
thereby dismissing what we have defined as the traditional view. 
 
The right to migration and basic human rights 
An important question in regard to states right to control their borders, which we have not yet 
considered, is the question as to whether there is such a thing as a right to freedom of 
movement, and if so, how it should be understood in practice? Is there a human right to 
migration that implies a human right to cross borders, as well? If there is a right to migration 
and it should be seen as human right, it would pose great problems for states’ right to control 
particular territories because then, denying would-be immigrants entry to the state, would 
conflict with their human rights. To answer whether there is a human right to migration, 
necessitates discussing how to categorize a right to migration, as well as a clarification of our 
general understanding of human rights31 and what responsibility they impose on states. Miller 
wants to challenge that there is a right to migration, including the right to cross borders, based 
on freedom of movement, and that it should be seen as a human right in line with other human 
rights of freedom, such as freedom of religion. For Miller, if the right to migration is to be seen 
as a human right, it will need to be proven as a “Basic Freedom” as opposed to a “Bare 
Freedom”. To understand these concepts, we also need to account for Basic Needs, which 
generate Basic Human Rights, as the source of many basic freedoms. 
According to Miller, what counts as basic needs is generated by our conception of what 
physically and socially counts as harms32; whether this is a physical harm, such as suffering 
pain, or a social harm, such as not being able to support oneself. People have the right not to be 
harmed in these ways and thus have basic needs, which generate basic human rights preventing 
                                                           
31
 In the above section we have furthermore referred to basic human rights. Basic human rights are Miller’s 
configuration of rights that fulfil need general to all human beings in order for them to live a minimally decent 
human life. Further discussion about this concept will be provided in this section. 
32
 For Millers specific conception of this see Miller 2007 chapter 7 p. 180ff 
 47 
them from these kinds of harm (Miller 2007: 179). These basic, physical and social needs are 
based on an overall idea of harm defined thusly:  
 
‘[…] a person is harmed when she is unable to lead a minimally decent life in the society in 
which she belongs’ (Miller 2007: 181).  
 
This definition of harm is considered by Miller to be universal, even if, as he says, it could be 
seen as surreptitiously referring ‘to norms of decency that are in fact specific to one society, or a 
small range of societies, for instance those in the developed west.’ (Miller 2007: 183). He 
claims this by referring to the basic needs conception he is advancing, which is based on an 
objective approach, going across different cultures; these are needs that have to be fulfilled in 
order to avoid harm, if one is to live a minimally decent life. In doing so, he determines what 
“core social activities”, as well as physical needs, are central across all cultures. That he focuses 
on “core social activities” signifies that basic needs are not grounded in the specific 
configuration of any activity in a specific culture, but in the “core” activity of every culture – 
the general opportunity to work, to have an education, etc. Returning to whether the right to 
migration, to cross borders, should be seen as a human right, it must be weighed against 
whether it is grounded in basic needs and thus is needed in order to lead a minimally decent life. 
If it can be shown that a person is not able to lead a minimally decent life without the right to 
cross borders, it should be seen as a basic need for a basic freedom, generating a basic human 
right. 
To Miller, it does seem plausible that there is a right to freedom of movement, different to 
the freedom to cross borders. Think, for instance, about the need for the ability to actually move 
freely in physical spaces. Being shackled or confined to a small place intuitively tells us that 
this is incompatible with living a decent life (Miller 2007: 205). Miller also agrees with 
expanding the right to a wider extent, this time, however, appealing to the instrumental gains. 
Having a right to move freely in a society can be necessary to be able to find a job, find a 
marriage partner, etc – all elements of a decent life. Miller therefore concludes that the freedom 
of movement qualifies as a basic human right, by appealing to basic human needs, i.e. 
conditions and items that render a person able to live a decent life. 
So far we have shown that Miller does conceive of the freedom of movement as a basic 
human right, but also that the needs described can all – potentially at least – be met within any 
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one society; it is not clear that you need to have a human right to cross borders in order to find a 
job, a marriage partner or to satisfy any of the other basic human needs described above. Thus, 
the reasoning so far has yet to prove that there ought to exist a right to freedom of movement 
across borders. Furthermore, even in liberal societies that provide the living conditions for its 
citizens to live a decent life, there are a number of exceptions to the right of freedom of 
movement. Moving into a property, owned by a private person, without the consent of that 
person, is not allowed; public spaces may be heavily regulated, e.g. the opening hours of public 
parks, libraries etc. This means that, even in liberal societies, with these everyday life 
limitations, few would argue its citizens are deprived of the human right to freedom of 
movement. This is because, in liberal societies, sufficient freedom of movement is given: 
 
‘[T]o protect the interests that the human right to free movement is intended to protect, 
even though the extent of freedom of movement is very far from absolute’ (Miller 2007: 
206).  
 
Because sufficient freedom is given in decent societies, even with its restrictions, there cannot 
be a right to freedom of movement across borders. Your basic needs for freedom of movement 
can be satisfied within such a society, and this point needs stressing. What it essentially means 
is that the right of freedom of movement across borders would be obsolete in a world of decent 
states, because these would all in fact meet the basic needs of the would-be migrant. It is then 
not a right that is applicable at all times, and therefore not a basic human right with a general 
justification. 
This is not to say that there cannot be cases where this right of freedom of movement is not 
satisfied; if a country does not provide the conditions of living a minimal decent life because the 
need to freedom of movement is not satisfied, it is a violation of that person’s basic human right 
to freedom of movement. And because this is a Basic Human Right, it follows that ‘any agent, 
individual or collective, who is able to protect them may in principle bear remedial 
responsibilities.’ (Miller 2007: 164) The ‘in principle’ part of the quote signifies that, in cases 
of a human rights violation of freedom of movement, it is not clear which of any capable agents 
should protect the violated, because the agents able to protect the violated are not responsible 
for the violation. This does not, then, entail that just because I have a basic human right to 
freedom of movement and this right is violated, I can claim to have the right to be allowed into 
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the a specific state of my liking (country X), so long as my right could be respected by 
acceptance into another country able to provide for the needs otherwise denied me (countries Y 
and Z). For example, it might be that I live in a country where my basic needs are not fulfilled. I 
have heard a great deal of good things about Sweden, so I wish to start a new life there. But if 
the basic needs I am being denied could just as well be met in Morocco, or Spain, and it just so 
happens that both Morocco and Spain would grant me entry while Sweden would not, my rights 
would be sufficiently met, and Sweden would be justified in not opening its borders to me; 
again, a basic human right to freedom of movement does not entail a general right of freedom to 
cross borders. Miller describes it with the analogy of marriage rights: 
 
‘where by no means everyone is able to wed the partner they would ideally like to have, 
[…] most have the opportunity to marry someone.’ (Miller 2007: 209, Original emphasis). 
 
We can sum up the right to freedom of movement into five main points. It includes: a) a basic 
human right which b) is satisfied whenever sufficient freedom is given and c) the right is then 
not absolute and d) therefore does not generate a general right to freedom of movement, e) 
including borders. This entails that, even in cases of a freedom of movement rights violation, 
while you have the right to be protected from this violation, it does not follow that the person in 
need can enter into any country of his or her choice. As long as protection can be given by 
either helping in the place of current residence, or by providing access to another country, this is 
sufficient to meet the basic needs of persons in need. 
The consequence is that a right to migration is more like a Bare Freedom, which is 
grounded in a desire, or simply a wish for this freedom to be fulfilled (Miller 2007: 204). 
Wishes and desires that go beyond ‘everyone’s minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of 
humanity’ (Miller 2007: 164) and therefore does not ground a basic human right. Indeed, Miller 
describes the freedom of crossing borders purely as a desire, or interest, equivalent to another’s 
desire to purchase an Aston Martin: 
 
‘It would be good from my point of view if I were free to purchase an Aston Martin 
tomorrow, but that is not going to count as a morally significant freedom – my desire is not 
one that imposes any kind of obligations on others to meet it’ (Miller 2007: 204) 
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In opposition to Basic Freedoms that generate human rights, Bare Freedoms then only ground 
weaker claims on others. They do not impose ‘any obligations on others to meet it’, because 
they are not important in order to uphold the standards of living a minimally decent life. 
But why would people be prone to move across borders in the first place? One of the main 
reasons, according to Miller, would be to participate in a culture not represented in ones native 
country. But again, this argument fails to generate a general right. For Miller, what a person can 
legitimately claim as a human right is that of an adequate range of options to choose from, such 
as options that render it possible to satisfy occupational, religious, cultural activities etc., but not 
all ranges of options(Miller 2007: 207). Something less than an absolute list is sufficient (notice 
here how adequacy resembles sufficiency from before). If this claim could not be fulfilled 
within only one country, it would then be sufficient for the right of migration to generate a 
general right. As adequacy to Miller is defined in terms of basic needs, most modern states 
already provide an adequate range of options to its inhabitants. There will be a wide range of 
occupational options available to you, so even though the one specific job you want as a 
professional dart player or opera singer may not be provided for, there is still access to an 
adequate range of options in terms of getting a job, thereby satisfying your basic needs. 
Briefly summarised, even though there does exist a basic human right to freedom of 
movement, as this is seen as an indispensable part of being able to live a minimally decent life, 
there is not a general right to cross borders – a right to migration. A general basic human right 
to freedom of movement across borders would be one that trumps border control in each 
instance. Nevertheless, would-be immigrants may retain a strong interest in migrating to 
another land. Dismissing their wish to enter into the country of their liking, by referring to the 
fact that they do not have the right to enter, is not enough to justify this proposition when 
admission would greatly improve their opportunities in life (Miller 2007: 222). For border 
control to be justified, it needs to be shown that states ought to exercise this right (ibid). Having 
a strong desire may not ground basic human rights, but it does ground the right to an 
explanation of why you are being excluded. 
 
Self-determination, national goals and democracy 
To Miller, the justification for why states can exclude would-be immigrants is found by linking 
immigration policy to the general goals of a society. Because immigration impacts the age 
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profile of a country, as well as the size of its population, the supply and demand on the labour 
market, the cultural make-up of the country etc., and consequently impacts current citizens’ life 
and possibilities, the interests of those citizens have great value (Miller 2007: 222-223). In fact, 
its value is so great that they should have the right to decide who can become a member - which 
is equal to saying that they have the right to control immigration. The interests the citizens have 
are reflected in the national goals, which then may be either for or against certain types of 
immigration, depending on how it will impact the country and in what direction current citizens 
wishes for the country to develop33 (ibid: 223). The right to border control is justified as long as 
it reflects the national goals of the people. This is not to say that the interest of current citizens 
always outweigh outsiders’ interests – such as the interests, and more importantly the needs, of 
refugees for instance – yet, because allowing immigrants into one’s society affect the citizens in 
important ways, it should be the citizens themselves that have the right to decide. It is 
essentially an appeal to the self-determination that a political community can have, and 
consequently its right to decide on who can become a member of this community and be a part 
of shaping it in the future. 
At this juncture it may be a good time to consider the role democracy and national identity 
plays in LN. Miller himself briefly considers an objection that has been made against his 
position and the idea of national goals: that LN assumes a kind of ‘homogenous national culture 
in which all participants share the same goals’ (Miller 2007: 224). If national goals are to 
ground the self-determination of a nation, it will need to have the unequivocal support of the 
people. The problem is that if, for instance, the people of a country have an interest in 
increasing the use of its national language by limiting immigrants that do not share that 
language, a linguistic minority may have precisely the opposite interest, as they would prefer 
more diversity in the languages spoken34. Presumably, then, national goals are not a good 
justification for border control as there is no realistic consensus about them, and consequently 
they are a poor standard for grounding specific public policies of immigration. Miller 
acknowledges this objection as important, so he attempts to refute it with this argument: 
 
                                                           
33
 There can be limit to the way it should be carried out nonetheless, as Miller does not accept any racist or any 
another way discriminatory praxis regarding the selection process of who can be a member (selection on grounds 
of language can be defended however according to Miller) (Miller 2007: 228). 
34
 This is Miller’s own example. 
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‘I may disagree with the current language policy of my state, but it is to my advantage 
nonetheless that the policy is the subject of democratic process that takes my concerns into 
account, and that on other occasions will generate policies that I favor. It is also in my 
interest to belong to a community with a shared sense of national identity, even if that 
identity conflicts at certain points with my own cultural values, if we assume that the 
shared identity performs valuable functions in holding the community together, enabling 
democracy, and providing the motivation for policies of social justice’ (Miller 2007: 224, 
my emphasis). 
 
All citizens of a country have a common interest in being able to set the national goals through 
a ‘process of democratic debate’. This common interest is deeper than the interest in the single 
policy subject, which is why national political community does not need to agree on every 
instance of public policy – such as language policy for example - as long as they agree on the 
terms on which policies are decided35. Similarly, belonging to a national community, with a 
shared sense of national identity, regardless of whether your cultural values deviate at certain 
point with this, is in your deeper interest because it can hold the community together, facilitate 
democracy, as well as provide a motivation for adopting policies of social justice. That a 
community’s members have a sense of belonging to that community and to the national identity 
of that community is important for the justification. 
Let us now consider what role democracy plays in LN a little further. Although Miller 
uses very little space to discuss this particular aspect, of his view (three pages, 222 – 224) it 
strikes me as being of considerable importance, because it has a very important function in the 
justification for border control. As we have already seen, according to Miller, a sound 
justification for border control within LN is one that links immigration policies and national 
goals. And these arrive most clearly in the form of public policies, reflecting common interests 
within the society. Yet a political community having these goals does not entail that every 
member of the community must agree on a specific policy. What is required is only that every 
member agrees on the fact that there can be made public policies at all. Compare this quote: 
 
‘[A]lthough different individuals and groups are likely to disagree about the priorities that 
their political community should pursue, they have a common interest in being able to set 
those goals through democratic debate, and this of course entails being willing to accept 
majority decisions reached through proper procedures’ (Miller 2007: 224). 
 
                                                           
35
 This is perhaps what Chryssochoo refers to as a “civic identity” (cf. chapter two). 
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Bear in mind that Miller, with this assertion, is trying to defend against the objection to LN, 
which criticizes it for assuming a homogenous national culture of completely shared goals. His 
response here, instead of appealing to a consensus driven support for the national goals and the 
culture of a society, is to assume a common support for democratic decision-making and a sense 
of “belonging together” to the same community – a shared sense of national identity. In doing 
so, he avoids having everyone to agree on everything. In this way, all Miller needs is for the 
members to agree on a deeper level – with the manner in which public policy is formulated and 
which is advantageous to have a sense of national identity. If these premises are plausible, the 
intuition underlying the justification can be defended. The effect of this is that democratic 
decision making, as well as a shared sense of national identity, become necessary conditions for 
the justification of border control and, in effect, an essential part of the view. 
If what we have written in this section so far has been true, it strikes me that democracy in 
the LN view may indeed have a crucial role to play. Democracy and national identity in this 
regard can be seen not just as beneficial to the society, but as a component so essential that a 
society without democracy cannot justify border control. Whether or not this is in fact the case, 
democracy and national identity plays an important role in LN’s justification of border control 
ceteris paribus. 
Before moving on to the question as to whether LN can be applied to the EU-level, let us 
briefly sum up what we have gone through so far. LN’s argument for border control includes 
several steps. Firstly, we have seen that a state, functioning as a representative of its people, can 
have territorial rights and that particular state could have rights over a particular territory. The 
justification for this assumption was given through the efficiency argument and the occupancy – 
transformation argument. The fact that a state can have territorial rights, and consequently 
control over who can enter into its territories, does not, however, preclude that it can have 
responsibility towards outsiders. Some people may be left in such a bad state that their basic 
needs are threatened to a degree that they do not have the possibility of living a decent life. In 
these cases, states have a duty to protect those individuals. The logic underlying this assumption 
is that basic needs generate basic human rights that, as an exception to the right of border 
control, leave a responsibility with decent states to help persons in need. But the state also has a 
responsibility towards people not threatened by conditions that do not satisfy living a decent 
life. For this it needs another justification. According to LN, a community may decide who it 
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admits and who it does not on grounds of the members’ interests, because immigration may 
affect their life in a substantial way. As long as there is a general support for the democratic 
system and a sense of a shared national identity, political communities can have right of self-
determination strong enough to ground a right to restrict immigration. This is the justification 
for why the state can justifiably turn away would-be immigrants. 
 
Liberal Nationalism and EU 
How can we assess whether LN can be applied to the EU level? Our initial challenge was that 
most philosophical theories of immigration took its departure in justifying states’ right to 
control immigration. LN is a good example of this. As we saw in chapter two, the EU is neither 
a nation state nor a federal state, but some kind of an international political association sui 
generis. For this reason it is not clear that philosophical immigration theories apply to the EU. 
More specifically, how well do the arguments for border control, designed to apply at the 
national level, fit the EU-level? Could the arguments be understood in a way that makes them 
directly valid at the EU-level, do they need some kind of an adjustment in order to be 
applicable, or are there actually grounds for refusing them altogether in the EU-context? Our 
strategy to assess these issues will be to outline the core arguments and concepts of the LN view 
in regard to immigration and in turn discuss whether these can be extended directly to the EU-
level or not. The core arguments of LN we will go through include the efficiency argument, the 
occupation–transformation argument and the role of national identity and democracy. The rights 
of people in need will furthermore inform our discussion of the core arguments for border 
control.  
The efficiency argument 
Trying to apply the efficiency argument to the EU-level raises two questions. Firstly, is the 
context in which the original argument was made similar to an EU-context in regard to its 
applicability – is there an ontological fit between the argument and the EU? Secondly, if this is 
indeed the case, what preliminary conclusions can we draw in regard to whether the EU is 
justified in restricting immigration, according to the argument? We can include this last part in 
order to see the arguments in action, so that we can attain a better understanding of it. One way 
to look for an ontological fit is to look for similarities between those features of a state that 
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render the efficiency argument applicable to the nation state level, and the corresponding 
features of the EU. Looking into the original argument we saw that one of the basic 
requirements is that the state have political authority over a determinate territory, in order to 
carry out its functions, and that this should be done in a way that makes it possible for the 
people to know the laws to which they are subject. The alternative would be far less efficient 
and thus unjustifiable. Is this the case with the EU? 
First off, are the laws and rules to which EU-citizens are subject clear enough to easily 
engage in economic or otherwise beneficial activities? While some policy areas, such as the 
laws decided by qualified majority voting, are very clearly subject to EU control (in as much as 
we see cases of supranationalisation as EU control) other areas are subject to decision-making 
procedures requiring unanimity which gives the individual member state decisive power. Other 
policy areas, again, are outside of EU competence. What laws and rules an EU-citizen is subject 
to then depends on the concrete policy. We could see this with the immigration policy area, 
where it ranges from communitarised policy areas, such as irregular immigration and asylum to 
areas where the prerogative is the member states’, such as assigning citizenship and determining 
the number of work-permits. While on paper, this division may seem more or less clear, the 
practical reality does not seem as straightforward. This is true even though, realistically, some 
degree of complexity is to be expected when we have different levels of authority operating at 
the same territory. Many EU-policies are designed to support activities and processes already 
taking place in the member states so many overlaps occur when you look closely at what policy 
areas are being regulated and how. If, for instance, we ask as to who decides EU’s immigration 
policy, what are we to reply, other than that the answer can be found somewhere between the 
EU institutions and the member states? Is this division of authority and competence clear 
enough for the citizens to engage in activities together? 
At this juncture, the objection that these are just practical matters, and that what matters is 
the form the EU, as a political institution with authority, takes, cannot neither be fully dismissed 
nor completely acknowledged. On the one hand, this is of course a correct objection to make, 
under normal circumstances. After all, the original question is whether the EU can be regarded 
as an authoritative political institution in a way that enables beneficial activities between 
citizens. Because if this could be shown, it would prove that the efficiency argument worked at 
the EU-level. On the other hand, exactly because the EU is an institution sui generis traditional 
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categories, the LN-view may be inapplicable. In this case a possible solution might be to look 
openly at the practice of the EU and its member states, in order to try and determine whether the 
argument applies. Turning our attention back to the question then, I would propose to ask in this 
way: can the EU be said to be an institution that can have territorial rights, justified by its 
efficiency results, that both renders its residents aware of which rules to which they are 
subjected (and that these rules are in fact the same for everyone), and is the EU capable of 
engaging in profitable activities for its people, exercising its authority over the territory? 
It seems to me that the answer to both parts of the question is yes. First off, while the 
authoritative regime (who decides EU’s immigration policy as an example) certainly appears 
complicated for the average citizen, the practical reality is that most decisions in the EU is 
mediated through its member states, meaning that citizenship of a country makes you a subject 
of that country’s authority as long as you are within that country’s territory. When you move on 
to the territory of another member state, you are then subject to that country’s authority, even 
though you have citizen rights that transcend the country’s authority. That these laws may, to a 
certain extent, be influenced by EU-decisions, or even by other, outside factors, does not change 
this conclusion. It seems plausible to me, then, that the EU functions in a way that makes it 
possible for its citizens to engage in beneficial activities in an effective way. Even if this regime 
could, in fact, be optimized in certain ways that would make it even more efficient, it would not 
undermine this conclusion. It would have to be shown that a non-monopolized way of 
organizing authority would be more beneficial to its citizens. 
In regard to the other part of the question, whether EU is capable of engaging in important 
public planning throughout its territory, I also assert that this is, in fact, the case. The answer to 
this question relies heavily on whether or not one considers the member states of the EU to be 
an integral part of the EU. If the member states are addressed as part of the EU system, I think 
the correct conclusion one can draw is that the EU is, in fact, capable of engaging in public 
planning throughout its territory. The policy examples given by Miller were environmental, 
transportation and planning of physical space. These are activities that are both going on at the 
member state level, as well as the EU level. If the member state level also adheres to the EU-
level, it seems obvious to me that the EU lives up to this requirement as well. 
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The occupancy–transformation argument 
Our second question concerns the occupancy-transformation argument. There seems to be good 
reason to assume that, if LN can be applied to the EU in regard to the efficiency argument, then 
this also holds trur for the occupancy–transformation argument. If we assume the argument to 
be solid on the nation state level, this would also apply to the member states of EU, as they are 
nation states themselves. And so throughout history, they have occupied and transformed the 
land they have today as nations, thereby strengthening their claim to the territorial right. If we 
then also consider that the EU member states are to be viewed as part of the EU-system – that 
the EU is more than its “own” institutions, such as the European Parliament, the Commission 
etc., then the member states’ territorial rights could be said to collectively comprise an EU-
level. If this were the case, the occupancy–transformation argument would be satisfied. 
There are challenges to this conception, however. The territory of the present-day EU has 
not always been under the occupation of EU-member states. The EU is in many ways still a 
very young institution and most of the member states existed prior to its creation. Even to this 
day, the EU is expanding with new countries. Does the claim to territorial rights transfer 
directly from a nation state, prior to its membership of the EU, and onto the EU when that state 
becomes an EU-member? And what difference does it make when the collective EU-member 
states own it together? Regarding the question about whether the claim to territorial rights can 
be transferred, then, following Miller’s conception about inherited responsibility, it seems to me 
to be clear that it can. Becoming a member of the EU does not change the relations between 
generations inside a state. National responsibility can be passed on from generation to 
generation, both in terms of inheriting economic and cultural value that has been obtained by 
previous generations, but also their wrongdoings. If the people of a state decide to enter into a 
larger political association, such as the EU, they do not lose this inherited responsibility. They 
retain the same claim to the territory as they had prior to the membership. What is unclear, 
however, is how membership and the claim to territory play out in the collective context. Does 
membership of the EU involve transferring the territorial claims to the communal level, so that 
each member state has a part of the collective territorial right, in the same way a region of a 
state is part of the state’s claim to territory? A way to approach this would be to look at who is 
outcome responsible for the added economic and cultural value. To answer this precisely, 
dividing each member state’s fair share into each their own pots, is most likely impossibly 
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complicated. The economic interdependence between the member states and EU’s share in this 
- not least through the internal market - can hardly be disentangled in order to assess each part’s 
fair share. Perhaps this is evidence that the territorial claims of the EU-member states, based on 
the added economic value, should be seen as collective. I would, at the face of it, say that 
cultural claims are easier to distinguish from each other. However, one may just as easily argue 
that there is a sense of the European history of ideas, for instance about Christianity, human 
rights etc., that are not so easily distinguishable from each other. If this latter conception is 
more correct, it may suggest to us that the added cultural value could also be seen as a 
collective claim. 
National identity and democratic decision making 
The third core argument regarding LN’s justification of border control concerns the role of 
national identity and the need for a system of democratic decision-making. Let us recall that the 
reason a state, as a representative of its people, can be justified in restricting immigration is that 
the members of a national community are greatly impacted by immigration, and accordingly 
have interests in deciding who can become a member of that community, e.g. limiting 
immigration. A community has the right to self-determination on these grounds. What binds the 
community together is a shared sense of national identity that, together with a system of 
democratic decision making, makes everyone’s voice are heard. But can the EU be said to have 
a national identity? After all, it is a political union between states that in themselves have a 
national identity. And what about LN’s view on democracy – does it apply to the democratic 
system of EU? We can approach both these questions from two different angles; does the 
concept of a shared sense of national identity work at a common EU-level in principle, and does 
it work in practice as well? Likewise with the question about the democratic system: are there 
reasons to think that this conception, in principle, can be extended to the EU level? And how 
does the practical reality fare against satisfying the conditions? For our purposes, the question 
about whether it can be extended, in principle, is the most important, although the more 
practical, empirical question may be worthwhile including for exemplary purposes. 
Does the EU have a national identity? Beside the fact the EU is not a nation (at least not 
yet) and so, the idea of the EU having a “national” identity may seem a bit weird, we can start 
by noting that there are, at least, several national identities within the EU. Presumably, each 
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member state has a sense of national identity – a German national identity, a French national 
identity etc. – but what about the EU as one common association? The keyword to determine 
this is “belonging”. Do the citizens of the EU feel as though they belong to an EU-community? 
And if so, how does this sense of belonging relate to their sense of belonging to their national 
community? On the principal level, then, we can ask whether belonging to one community 
excludes you from belonging to another. I am not sure whether LN provides any direct answer 
to this, but if we look at why belonging to a community is needed as part of that community’s 
right to self-determination, we may get closer to an answer. The reason “belonging” is such a 
central concept is that it ultimately is the sense of belonging to a community that creates the 
support for it and its right to self-determination. Belonging, in this sense, is what binds the 
community together through national goals that determine in which direction the community 
evolves in the future, including who becomes a member of the community. Does this 
conception rule out belonging to two (or more), mutually existing national identities? 
Establishing a European national identity would require EU-citizens to have a strong 
sense of belonging to the EU-community. The fact that they already belong to another national 
society can be said to signify at least two different things. Firstly, each member states’ national 
identity may vary in regard to the identity’s adherence to a supposed EU-community. This 
connection to the EU-identity may appear to be strong or weak, and, depending on the strength 
of belonging needed in the original argument, it may or may not live up to the requirements of 
constituting a national identity. In this view, an EU-identity is mediated through its member 
states’ national identities. Examples of this can perhaps be seen when countries are referred to 
play a certain role in the EU – Berlusconi’s Italy as the black sheep of Europe, Merkel’s 
Germany as mother-Europe etc. The central idea is that each member state’s identity is bound to 
that of the larger EU community. Following this line of thinking, there appears to be good 
reason to assume that the EU can in principle have a “national” identity. While this may not be 
the case in the practical reality of today, it could be, in principle, if the national identity of each 
member state had a strong enough connection to the EU-identity. 
Another approach may be to emphasize that having a shared sense of belonging to a 
national identity requires recognizing special obligations to one’s compatriots (Miller 2007: 
223). Taken to its extreme, recognizing special obligations to compatriots excludes connecting 
beyond the identity of one community. If this is true, citizens of a member state must then either 
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owe special obligations toward the EU-member state country in which they are born, or to the 
collective EU-community. Given the structure of EU, such a conception would most likely 
entail that an EU-identity is not the case. National identification is much stronger in the member 
states. This seems to be the case with the EU today, if we look at some recent studies 
(Eurobarameter 2012: 7). However, in principle, it need not be like that. If we look at the US, it 
seems far from unlikely that a citizen of Wisconsin identifies more strongly with that of being 
an American than being a Wisconsin citizen. Whether this mainly applies when there is a 
convergence of values between Wisconsin and the federal state, or whether it is determined by 
other factors, is less important. At least in principle, it seems to be a possibility. But even 
though the EU is a union of states, it is not as integrated as the US. The US is a federal state, 
while the EU is something less than that in terms of integration. For the EU to have an identity 
strong enough to outweigh national identities, it may need to move in the direction of something 
like the US.  We can then conclude that it is possible to talk of identity and the EU in the LN 
sense of national identity – although a more proper term might be “regional identity” when 
referring to the EU. What we can then reasonably conclude, whether or not the EU does satisfy 
the conditions for having a regional identity today, is that it at least seems possible, again, in 
principle, that it can satisfy this condition in the future. 
To finish out this section we will examine whether the LN view on democracy applies to 
the EU in principle. It should be stressed that LN is not a theory about democracy and therefore 
does not have an elaborate conception about the specific democratic system it supports. In fact, 
LN may be read to indicate that any form of democratic system may work, as long as it takes 
the concerns of the community-members into account (Miller 2007: 222 – 224). Democratic 
decision-making is important because every member of a community has, if not a right, then at 
least a strong interest in being able to influence the national goals, thereby ensuring 
representation of his or her values. Again, this is not to say that a member must have all of his 
or her values represented in national goals; it is more that those goals are the subject of a 
democratic procedure, which takes their concerns seriously, sometimes leading one’s own 
values to be made into policy. For these reasons, I see no argument for why there, at the EU-
level, cannot exist a system that satisfies the conditions of LN in principle. Practical reality may 
speak a different story, however, if we take into consideration issues such as democratic deficit, 
accountability and representation. I will not delve deeper into these questions here, as I believe 
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it would remove us to much from our overall query, but I find that the EU’s supposed 
democratic deficit influences its justification for border control to be a highly worthwhile 
subject for discussion. 
 
Chapter summary 
In this section, we have examined David Miller’s configuration of Liberal Nationalism. We 
have seen why,  according to LN, it makes sense that a state, as the representative of the people 
it govern, can have territorial rights, and we have seen how such a state may acquire a claim to 
territorial rights of a particular territory. The former was shown through the efficiency 
argument, which, in short, claims that a monopoly of political authority is the most efficient 
way of organizing a society. The latter was shown through the occupancy–transformation 
argument, which defined how the people of a state, by occupying and transforming a territory, 
attain a special relationship with that territory as well as the rightful claim to the added value 
produced through occupation of that territory. This added value is both meant in an economic 
sense as well as a cultural sense. Furthermore, we have seen that identity and democracy plays 
an important role in justifying border control, while at the same time emphasizing the value for 
a people to have self-determination. We also saw that, according to Miller, there does not exist 
a human right to migration/freedom to cross borders, but that states nevertheless have 
responsibilities that extend beyond its own confines, most notably in regard to persons in need. 
In the last part of the chapter, LN’s compatibility with the EU was discussed. We saw 
that, in regard to the territorial rights of the state in LN, both the efficiency argument and the 
occupancy–transformation argument could be extended to the EU-level, although our 
discussion also highlighted a certain degree of opacity here. In regard to the role of national 
identity and democracy, we discussed different ways of how to perceive national identity in the 
regional EU context. We found that, in principle, LN could be changed in a way that rendered it 
applicable to the EU context, but was far from practical reality. The concept of belonging in 
regard to competing national or regional identities, could profitably be included more directly in 
the LN position. Similarly, with the role of democracy, there seems to be no reason why the 
EU, in principle, cannot have a democratic system that takes the concerns of its community 
members into account. But practical reality may be behind in this regard, suggesting that an 
LN-founded analysis of the EU would possibly reveal its democratic system to be lagging in 
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important aspects, and that the EU for that reason may not be justified in having the right to 
border control. 
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Ryan Pevnick: The Associative Ownership view 
Another approach to the question of states’ right to control their own borders comes from the 
American scholar Ryan Pevnick. In his book Immigration and the Constraints of Justice from 
2011, he gives an account of a normative immigration theory, which he terms “Associative 
Ownership”, or “AO”. Although less established, this view does seem to have some interesting 
approaches in regard to being applicable to the EU-level due to its strict focus on ownership of 
institutions. The central claim of Associative Ownership approach is as follows:  
 
‘[P]olitical communities [can be seen] as ongoing collective projects that can gain 
entitlements to the institutions and resources that they construct’ (Pevnick 2011: 184).  
 
Political communities can have a justified claim of self-determination, and thereby also 
immigration restrictions, as the institutions of a specific community, to which any immigrant is 
trying to gain access, are made by the members of said community; they built it and therefore 
own it, the simplified explanation goes.  Therefore, it should be the community responsible for 
building the political institutions that have the right to decide who should and should not be able 
to become a member and, in effect, the grounds for controlling migration. Arguing his case, 
Pevnick contends that his theory lives up to Rawls’ idea of ‘society as a fair system of 
cooperation over time, from one generation to the next’ (Rawls 1993: 15, quoted in Pevnick 
2011: 184). However, before venturing deeper into Pevnick’s arguments, two comments must 
be made. 
Firstly, in describing his approach Pevnick spends a great deal of time trying to balance 
our intuitive convictions about immigration and a logically consistent theory through which a 
‘[d]iscussion regarding the justifications underlying the various normative positions’ (Pevnick 
2011: 6) is possible. It is, in other words, essential to find a way of settling normative, academic 
disputes that also leaves room for our moral intuitions. Pevnick’s solution involves the process 
of “reflective equilibrium”, known perhaps most famously from Rawls (ibid: 6). The relevance 
of reflective equilibrium will be apparent throughout the chapter, but in short, it can be seen as a 
test that you must put your theory up against in order to justify it, and see if it avoids the 
deepest pitfalls of unbearable moral consequences. In essence, it offers theoretical support for 
intuitive convictions, while at the same time testing the theory against our intuitive convictions. 
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Fundamentally, the Associative Ownership view is an attempt to create a theoretical foundation 
that accord with the intuitions we have in place for immigration policy and collective 
ownership. The best example of this is how the justification for communities’ right of self-
ownership (what we will later introduce as the “labour argument”) is grounded in what Pevnick 
claims to be a pre-theoretical intuition. Furthermore, Pevnick presents us with a long list of 
examples throughout his book, seemingly in order to appeal exactly to our intuitive convictions, 
the importance of which I shall examine for that same reason. 
Secondly, it might seem odd to start out on the national level, by accounting for the 
justification of political communities’ self-determination, instead of going directly to the 
arguments for border control, an issue exactly posited at the threshold between the national, the 
international and the transnational. But in order to fully understand the justification for border 
control, one needs first to understand the role of communities’ right of self-determination and 
their collective ownership over institutions in Pevnick’s theory. We will begin by looking at the 
argument of self-determination and collective ownership, and then venture on to engage with 
the positive arguments for border control/ migration management. Concluding the chapter, the 
AO-view will be applied to the real world case of the European Union to see whether the theory 
is capable of ‘going international’. 
 
Self-determination, ownership and contribution 
One of the key assumptions of AO is that political communities have a right to self-
determination: 
 
‘Members of a state have a prima facie right to make their own decisions about policies 
under which they live’ (Pevnick 2011: 27).  
 
This claim is essentially universal, structured upon our moral intuitions about ownership. 
Pevnick attempts to show this through various examples, which we will go into greater depth 
with in a short while. Before doing so, it would be good, however, to say a little more about this 
claim. What is actually meant by prima facie right for instance (a term Pevnick uses to great 
length in his book)? 
By Prima Facie right is seemingly meant a Pro Tanto reason, a reason which does have 
considerable force, but nevertheless can be outweighed by other, more important reasons. One 
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clear example of this would be that even though members of a state can rightfully decide upon 
who can and cannot become members, there can be exceptions to this rule. For example, while 
irregular immigrants can rightfully be denied access and membership, asylum seekers cannot:  
 
‘There are clear reasons of justice – reasons that outweigh considerations of ownership – to 
grant such individuals full citizenship’ (Pevnick 2011: 40, original emphasis). 
 
In this example the ownership right a community have over its institutions (which is what 
enables the right to immigration restriction) is outweighed by more important reasons (reasons 
of justice). Another example would be how the AO views democracy; there are good reasons to 
accept democratic decision making but these can be overridden by even more important reasons 
(cf. below). So when the term prima facie right is used here, it is in this meaning of the phrase. 
As the question about what these ‘reasons of justice’ actually are is quite important, let us 
briefly comment on them as well. 
Pevnick is somewhat vague in describing what these “reasons of justice” would actually 
be. Different reasons such as ‘equal treatment’ (Pevnick 2011: 39) and ‘needs’ (ibid: 40) is 
mentioned, as well as the qualifier ‘through no fault of their own’ (ibid: 39), but besides these, 
Pevnick is not very elaborate about this issue. The closest we come as a baseline is what he 
calls the ‘preconditions for a decent life’ (ibid: 40), but again, this is not more specific than 
arguing that an ownership claim cannot be executed in a way that it impair a person’s 
opportunity to live a decent life. 
One way of settling this, which is what we are going to do, would be to accept that what 
the actual reasons of justice would amount to, is in fact an open question, which have not yet 
been settled. Although Pevnick later on discusses the right of subsistence, for example in the 
formulation of UN requirements of $2 per day, this is primarily because: ‘current public 
discourse focuses on the UN’s $2 per day line, I accept this line simply to clarify discussion’ 
(Pevnick 2011: 87). The tentative conclusion we can draw then, is that while a $2 per day 
baseline would seem like an agreeable starting point to discuss the reasons that outweigh justice 
in terms of immigration restrictions, the only thing which really have been settled is that 
immigration restrictions is exactly not without limitations itself. This means that even though, 
the claim that ‘members of a state have a prima facie right to make their own decisions about 
policies under which they live’ is essentially universal i.e. applicable to all states, there can still 
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be other reasons of justice that outweigh this claim. On the other side, it should also be kept in 
mind that while Pevnick argues for the right of members of a state to close their borders (to a 
certain degree) it is not the same as to say they should. If a community decides that they want to 
have completely open borders they are more than welcome to do so. What Pevnick argues 
against here is only that justice requires open borders (ibid: 108). To the AO view, the 
important part then is just that up until a certain limit it should be the community themselves 
that decides what to do. Having settled these preliminary issues for now, let’s return to the 
question about communities’ right to self-determination. 
Self-determination 
A significant question regarding self-determination is whether to look at it as a mere derivative 
of more basic principles or as part of justice itself. Should self-determination be valued out of 
instrumental gains or does it have a value transcending instrumental gains? Pevnick prefers the 
latter, stating: 
 
‘Democratic self-rule is part of any attractive ideal of justice and so there is a necessary 
loss (albeit one that could potentially be outweighed) in terms of justice when self-rule is 
sacrificed.’ (Pevnick 2011: 31, original emphasis) 
 
This means that, besides preferring self-determination for instrumental reasons (ie. that self-
determination may be the best way to obtain a country’s goals, such as just institutions), such 
also relies on arguments for basic fairness; only through democratic institutions are individuals 
respected properly. Because a political institution exercises power on behalf of its members, it 
needs to be democratic for the members to have a say as shareholders of said institution. This 
means that democratic institutions are part of a just outcome, and not just an instrument in 
achieving it. Keep in mind, that even though Pevnick does see self-determination as a part of a 
just outcome, this is not to say that he sees it as an unbreakable principle (cf. the quote above). 
It is more of a pro tanto reason; democratic decisions may be overridden, but such instances 
must be earned by valuable outcomes (Pevnick 2011: 32). Pevnick does not suggest what these 
reasons might be, but they could reasonably be assumed to be something along the lines of 
equal treatment and fundamental needs of persons (cf. above). More importantly, it seems as 
though Pevnick does not attach great importance to the task of explicating them. For Pevnick, 
the central concern is purely to propose a theory of self-determination based on collective 
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ownership that is in line with our moral intuitions, and then use this theory to account for how 
immigration policies can be shaped accordingly. 
To display the difference between self-determination as an instrument of achieving justice 
and to see it as an instance of justice itself, Pevnick analyses an example given by Charles 
Beitz: 
 
‘Country A is an imperial country, and area B, a territorially distinct area with generally 
accepted boundaries, is A’s colony. Since A is the most benevolent of all imperial 
countries, there is no reason to think that granting independence to B will decrease the 
amount of social injustice in B; indeed, the opposite seems more likely because of various 
political and economic complications inside B which we don’t need to explain. 
Nonetheless, the residents of B, in a fair and free election, overwhelmingly indicate their 
preference for national independence’ (Beitz 1979: 103, quoted in Pevnick 2011: 31). 
 
According to Pevnick, this example shows that, without accepting self-determination as an 
instance of justice, you will come to a conclusion that is intuitively wrong. If the residents of B 
would actually be better off staying under the rule of A, in terms of social justice, and we only 
see self-determination as an instrument to achieving a just outcome, country A would be right in 
actually refusing to accept the results of B’s election. And to have an imperial country resist a 
call for independence from one of its colonies, and one based on the results democratic election 
no less, does not seem consistent with our intuitions. If country A, meanwhile, grants B its 
independence, the outcome will be worse in terms of social justice, but will emphasize B’s right 
of self-determination and therefore be more in line with our common intuitions, according to 
Pevnick’s claims. This is the central conception of self-determination. What we need now is the 
justification for this conception. 
The labour argument for ownership 
The key assumption about ownership is that a group, through a contribution of time, effort and 
money towards something, have the right to that something. A congregation that develops a 
youth education programme, for instance, can: 
 
‘claim an ownership stake in these programs that supplies them with a prima facie claim to 
make future decisions regarding the shape of such programs’ (Pevnick 2011: 33). 
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By virtue of their contribution, they own the programme and therefore have a right to decide its 
future, and when you claim ownership of something, you also entitle yourself to self-
determination. Most relevant for our discussion, though, is the right of ownership of 
institutions. And as long as the contribution is collective, the ownership claim can be assessed 
accordingly. For the sake of clarity, let us try and make a logical argument out of the basic 
assumptions. Some of the premises will be discussed at greater length shortly but, for now, it 
can be summarized as follows: 
 
P1: Contributing to an institution gives you an ownership claim over that institution 
P2: If all members of a community contribute to an institution they have a collective 
ownership claim over that institution 
P3: Having collective ownership over institutions grounds the right to make future 
decisions about the shape and direction of such institutions, including who can 
become a member 
P4: The right to make future decisions about the shape and direction of an institution 
is equal to having self-determination 
C: A community with self-determination is justified in choosing who can become a 
member 
 
Before moving on, the premises deserve some brief consideration. In regard to P1, ‘contributing 
to an institution’ here refers both to the creation of that institution as well as its sustenance; the 
more specific definition of ‘contribution’ is a subject we will return to later. As for P2, it should 
be noted that contributing to an institution both gives the individual an individual ownership 
claim and the group of individuals a collective ownership claim. In this argument, we are only 
interested in the collective ownership claim, because only in this respect does the justification 
for a community’s right of self-determination apply. In regard to P3, It is important to note that 
it is a pre-theoretical intuition, which grounds this claim. What we below call the “labour-
argument” is the justification for what is essentially a pre-theoretical assumption about our 
intuitions. 
Perhaps the most central claim of the AO-view is that collective ownership grounds a 
community’s right of self-determination. Immigration control, as we will see later, is simply a 
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derivative of this right36. Pevnick seeks to show this through what he calls ‘the labour argument 
for self-determination’. In the words of Lawrence Becker it can be summed up as follows: 
 
‘When the labor is (1) beyond what is required, morally, that one do for others; (2) 
produces something which would not have existed except for it; and (3) its product is 
something which others lose nothing by being excluded from; then (4) it is not wrong for 
producers to exclude others from the possession, use, etc. of the fruits of their labors. It is 
not so much that the producers deserve the produce of their labors. It is rather that no one 
else does, and it is not wrong for the laborer to have them.’ (Becker 1977: 41, quoted in 
Pevnick 2011: 34, original emphasis). 
 
One, then, attains a sense of ownership over the product of ones labour, a sense that can be 
expanded to applying to political institutions: because citizens of a country have contributed 
time, effort and money towards their political institutions, they own these institutions and 
consequently have the right of self-determination. 
Special attention needs to be paid to the third premise that ‘others lose nothing by being 
excluded from it’. This assertion is by no means unproblematic. To Pevnick, it amounts to the 
tentative conclusion that the Associative Ownership argument only justifies members’ limited 
claim of ownership. Thus, even though the aforementioned congregation might have property 
rights, these will only be justified for as long as it does not affect others in such a way that they 
will make a loss through exclusion from it, or, put another way, be harmed by another’s 
ownership. An example of this could be if said congregation had access to all the clean water 
available and insisted that others should respect their ownership claim over it. It stands to 
reason that such an ownership claim is unjustified because it will harm others! Furthermore, 
Pevnick stresses that the limitation also demands the needs of others to be taken into account; 
the prime example here in relation to immigration would be refugees. There seem to be further 
limitations, but Pevnick is not very specific with these matters. While this could owe to the fact 
that Pevnick primary goal is to establish a general framework for the Associative Ownership 
view, it complicates our attempts to apply the theory to the real world case of EU-immigration 
policy. Therefore, I will try and problematise the implications of this argument a bit further, 
drawing on Will Kymlicka’s critique of Robert Nozick’s arguments about ownership and initial 
                                                           
36
 We have not embarked on the discussion of immigration yet, but let it suffice to say that it is equal to 
deciding who can become a member – only in this instance the community is that of a nation state. The 
possible specificities of a nation state in regard to membership will be expanded upon later. 
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acquisition37. Kymlicka’s critique is useful here due to the important similarities between 
Nozick’s thesis and Pevnick’s labour-argument. Thus, the implications of this critique for 
Pevnick’s argument can lead to a more thorough understanding of his theory. 
The problem of self-ownership and initial acquistion  
Kymlicka’s critique of Nozick takes its departure in Nozick’s right-wing, libertarian conception 
of self-ownership and property-ownership. To Nozick, self-ownership is the fundamental way 
of respecting people as ends in themselves and not merely means. As the opening line of 
Nozick’s book indicates: 
 
‘Individuals have rights, and there are things which no individual or group can do to them 
(without violating these rights)’ (Nozick 1974: p.ix quoted in Kymlicka 2002: 107). 
 
Furthermore, to have self-ownership is to own yourself as well as your own skills, and to own 
your skills entails that you own whatever you produce with these skills. In fact, this claim is so 
strong that redistributive taxation from those with skills to those without, from rich to poor etc., 
is seen as unjust. Redistribution, as enacted in a welfare state for instance, is comparable to 
armed robbery – a form of paternalism that is incompatible with self-ownership. It is you alone 
that have the right to harvest the fruit of your own labour. When the argument is expanded from 
merely ‘self-ownership’ to ‘self-ownership entailing property-ownership’ then the question of 
initial acquisition of resources becomes important and thereby also the immediate link to the 
labour-argument’s p3; ‘[that the labour’s] product is something which others lose nothing by 
being excluded from’. We can summarize the problem as follows: property rights entail the 
usage of resources, resources which initially was the property of no one; but if you acquire 
something which others may have acquired just as well, can you then really argue that ‘others 
lose nothing by being excluded from’ it? It seems like the third condition in Becker’s argument 
is clearly violated here. 
The way Nozick solves this problem lies in the “Lockean Proviso”, his test of whether the 
initial acquisition is legitimate: 
                                                           
37
 The following argument builds largely on chapter 4 in Kymlicka’s 2. edition of Contemporary Political 
Philosophy – An introduction (Kymlicka 2002). As it is not within the limits of this thesis to give full credit 
to the more widespread discussion, the discussion will focus on the criticism that is most relevant to our 
object of investigation. 
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‘a process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously 
unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is 
thereby worsened’ (Nozick 1974: 178 quoted in Kymlicka 2002: 114). 
 
Notice that the third premise of the labour-argument is in fact stronger than this Lockean 
proviso. While in the P3, it is required that ‘others lose nothing by being excluded’, here others 
are allowed to lose something, say by the initial acquisition of common land by someone else, 
just as long as their compensation leaves them with ‘enough and as good’, as the original 
Locke-argument about The Tragedy of the Commons goes. As long as individuals are not 
overall disadvantaged by the act of appropriation, it is consistent with the equal worth of other 
individuals. But here we arrive at the critique, which can be applied to Pevnick’s labour-
argument as well, because now the question becomes ‘worse off in what ways, compared to 
what alternative?’ (Kymlicka 2002: 115). In fact, this is not one, but two questions; the first 
interrogates how and by which yardstick of measurement one is worse off, while the other 
questions about whether it arbitrarily narrows options in terms of viable alternative systems of 
organizing society. 
The problem highlighted by the first question – ‘worse off in what ways?’ – is that Nozick 
concentrates solely on the question of material welfare, when concerned with the initial 
acquiring of property rights. But there may very well be just as, if not more important values at 
stake concerning initial acquisition. Consider the following: someone acquires property rights 
over a piece of land, which you formerly owned; this could initially improve your material 
welfare through, say, wages received for working on that land. However, do these wages not 
come at the expense of depriving you of the freedom to utilize the land in the way you had done 
before? Perhaps you have a conception of yourself as a humble and content farmer, living in 
harmony with nature, but now some company acquires your land, converts it into a car park and 
leaves you to work as its guard.  Because if ‘enough and as good’ is only evaluated in terms of 
material welfare, then other important values are neglected. According to Kymlicka, even a 
value such as autonomy can be neglected in Nozick’s account, because in examples such as the 
one above, the acquisition could actually be made without your consent as long as it passes the 
“enough-and-as-good” test in terms of material welfare (Kymlicka 2002: 117). This could 
possibly leave us with serious concerns regarding the labour-argument. 
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Pevnick does, to some extent, guard himself from this criticism by arguing that the labour-
argument is consistent with not just the Lockean account of property rights, but just as well with 
a Millian38 account of property rights or, indeed, even a Humean39 view. This means that he can 
move beyond the Lockean proviso and accept an account of ‘enough and as good’ that 
embraces a wider array of values than merely material welfare. What is important for Pevnick is 
this: 
 
‘[R]ather than hinging on a variety of strongly Lockean claims, this version of the [labour] 
argument merely insists that – in the absence of competing claims – ones working to create 
a good alters ones relationship with it in a way that gives one a special ownership 
relationship with the good in question’ (Pevnick 2011: 34). 
 
This could lead us to an understanding of Pevnick’s Labour-argument as encompassing both 
material and non-material values, which together must be weighed up against each other so that 
they, in the act of acquisition, satisfy P3 in the labour-argument. This has the advantage of 
seeming to be in accordance with the conception of justice in the earlier example about self-
determination, with the colonialist A and the colony B. In that example, self-determination was 
seen as a part of justice so strongly that it actually outweighed reasons of material welfare. If we 
understand the labour-argument in this way, that there may be (other) reasons of justice that can 
outweigh an ownership claim, Pevnick avoids the attack, but only at the cost of reducing the 
ownership claim to a “limited ownership claim”, something which Pevnick himself confirms 
(Pevnick 2011: 35). Most important now, though, are the limitations of ownership claims, or, 
put differently, the constraints on ownership. 
Contribution and the non-contributor problem 
An important question raised by these examinations is how one practically defines labour. 
Labour appears to be understood best as: a form of contribution to a political institution within 
some sort of a social scheme of cooperation (this is my definition of Pevnick’s term). Ones 
ownership over that institution is then derived from ones contribution to it. This can simply be 
done through quotidian actions, such as going to work and paying your taxes, as well using ones 
                                                           
38
 Pevnick Quotes Mill for saying: ‘[…] property, in every defence of it, is supposed to mean the guarantee 
to individuals of the fruits of their own labour and abstinence’ (Pevnick 2011: 34). 
39
 ‘[…] property rights are purely conventional because any convention that would advance the utility of all 
would surely accommodate this intuition’ (Pevnick 2011: 34). 
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democratic rights (Pevnick 2011: 35). One need not be the grand architect of a political 
institution or, for that matter, be directly involved with the specific work in that same 
institution, to gain ownership over it. Rather, an ownership claim can just as well be attained 
through indirect contributions, such as paying taxes. While this might seem elementary, it is in 
fact crucial to the argument; because without accepting the more indirect ways of gaining 
ownership, a large part of a given population would be barred from having an ownership claim 
over the political institutions of the society in which they live. Less clear, however, is the 
manner in which these different contributions concord; is there a lower threshold of how much 
you need to contribute? Do some actions weigh more than others? And should we in fact see 
this ownership claim over the political institutions as a claim of private property where 
everyone owns a share, or as a claim of collective ownership? Is it each individual citizen that 
owns a share in the state, or is it only the citizens together, as some sort of a collectivized entity, 
who own it? In discussing contribution so far I have manly concentrated on economic 
contribution. However, as we have already seen, the labour-argument seems to count both 
material and non-material contribution as having value. For the purpose of discussion, let us try 
and focus on material contribution at first, and then turn to non-material contribution. 
Obviously, actions such as simply abiding the laws of the state are important because, without 
doing so, the institution would be likely to cease to exist. But for now, we shall pursue a clearer 
point of departure for our argument. 
First off, if we see the ownership claim as a claim to private property, and therefore 
assume that to gain an ownership claim over an institution, your contribution needs to pass over 
some threshold. It is not enough to contribute with a marginal amount. Perhaps you do not need 
to be a net contributor, but something more than a marginal amount of contribution should be 
required. What then about those who do not pass this threshold? Consider a person on welfare 
benefit, who, throughout his life, may not accumulatively have benefited enough to pass the 
threshold. If we see it as an ownership claim of private property, and we have a citizen who is a 
non-contributor, then what happens with that citizen’s ownership claim? Does that person then 
lose his or her ownership claim over the political institutions? And can that person rightfully be 
expelled from the political community if the community so wishes? Surely this would not be 
consistent with our common moral intuitions. There could perhaps be a way out, if one accepted 
that this would be an instance where the pro tanto right of self-determination of the members of 
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the state, would be trumped by an even more important reason against deportation of non-
contributing citizens. There are both arguments for and against this. An argument for this 
solution would be to compare the example of the unemployed non-contributor to the example 
given by Pevnick: that of a newborn infant. 
An infant has not yet contributed to the society into which it has been born and therefore 
cannot be said to have an ownership claim40. Pevnick, however, holds that in this situation, 
there are reasons concerned with justice that outweigh ownership (Pevnick 2011: 65). The 
interest of the child outweighs the ownership claim, and therefore it should be accepted as a full 
member of the political community. Yet, this argument does not seem to be analogous with the 
example of the unemployed non-contributor; the two differ substantially in at least one crucial 
respect, as: 
 
‘such individuals find themselves – through no choice of their own – enmeshed within a 
system of social cooperation (and protection) that importantly influences – and to a large 
extent determines – their life chances’ (Pevnick 2011: 65). 
 
The important notion here lies in the words ‘through no choice of their own’. While newborns 
naturally will have no possible means of contributing to the society, the same cannot be said 
about the unemployed non-contributor. Your options for contributing will obviously differ 
greatly, depending on whether your status as non-contributor is due to a severe mental or 
physical handicap, or whether you are “simply” unemployed. To avoid too many exceptional 
cases, however, let us limit our concern strictly to an unemployed non-contributor, who is not 
also, say, the recipient of some kind of incapacity benefit or the like. Yet even here it is heavily 
disputed whether this kind of non-contributor ever has an actual opportunity to contribute - or 
rather whether, or to what degree, he or she is to blame for his or her own failure to contribute. 
Take the case of present-day Spain or Greece, both countries struggling with a youth 
unemployment rate of around 50 %. Is it really the young people’s own fault that they are 
unemployed, or should the responsibility rather by placed with the system?  If the society in 
                                                           
40
 The actual reason for a newborn to have an ownership claim is actually different to the one I will address 
in this argument. Pevnick claims that the newborn inherits an ownership claim in a way resembling someone 
inheriting a family property - this will be addressed later in the chapter. 
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which you live in cannot provide full employment, can you then really place the burden of 
contribution on the individual? 
Some, like Rawls, claim that our position in society is basically a matter of natural or 
social lottery, and it is therefore not the individual, but the society that holds the responsibility. 
Others may weigh the individual responsibility heavier, claiming that everyone is the master of 
his own fate. Others again may have a third approach. These are big questions about social 
determination and responsibility, and ultimately about free will, the reaches of which are too far 
to delve in here. Nonetheless, I would argue that the AO-view needs a conception that allows 
for some form of responsibility to be assigned, if the labour-argument for ownership has to 
work. One reason to think so relates back to what we highlighted in the quote above, ‘through 
no fault of their own’. It is exactly because the newborn non-contributor cannot itself bear the 
burden of contribution that it can be excused. This would in turn mean that a person such as the 
unemployed non-contributor couldn’t have ownership rights, if he himself is to blame. On the 
other hand, if Pevnick is more in line with Rawls about ones position in society being a matter 
of natural or social lottery, the ‘through no fault of your own’ qualifier seems to be entirely 
redundant. Ultimately this leaves us with a somewhat fuzzy account of what contribution 
actually amounts to, and what role individual responsibility plays in the AO-view. This might 
be a good time to consider the non-material ways of contributing I mentioned before.  
The perhaps most obvious form of contribution to a political institutions is to conform to 
the laws of the state. Certainly, conforming to the laws of the state is an important element in, if 
not creating the political institutions, then at least keeping them sustained. Could this be enough 
non-material contribution in itself to gain an ownership claim over the political institutions? 
While it is certainly an important way of contributing to the existence of the institutions, it is 
not in and of itself enough to keep them sustained, as this also, at the very least, takes some 
amount of funding. Another way of contributing could be through democratic participation. 
This is certainly also an important non-material contribution to a democracy, in which its 
members actually participate through debates and vote in elections. But is this contribution 
enough to merit an ownership claim over the political institutions? To me, these are open 
questions and I do not think I am in a position to settle these questions here. Rather I simply 
want to present how unclear the prerequisites for attaining an ownership claim over political 
institutions are. 
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Before leaving this subject I want to discuss the case of the unemployed non-contributor 
against a person wanting to become a member from the outside - a would-be immigrant for 
instance. How do these two cases compare against each other? The straightforward explanation 
to why a community can deny membership to someone outside is because of their right of self-
determination. And rights of self-determination, in turn, rest on claims of ownership; ownership 
claims you gain through contribution. The dilemma then is either: 
 
a) Non-contributing citizen’s ownership claim can be derived through something 
else than the labour-argument. But how then, does this make the would-be member 
different from the non-contributor? Or  
b) The non-contributor does not actually have an ownership claim and can therefore, 
in principle be expelled/ deported. 
 
Regarding option a), there is still the possibility of something differentiating the non-
contributing member to the would-be member. And option b leaves us with, at least in my eyes, 
a somewhat counter-intuitive consequence that would have to be remedied in one way or 
another. We will examine this dilemma further by clarifying whether it is indeed an ownership 
claim in the sense of private property or in the sense of collective property, and see if the 
answer to this will solve the problem for the AO-view. One route to clarifying this can be found 
in a discussion about whether the ownership claim is confused with a claim of jurisdiction by 
the state. 
Private and collective property rights 
In this discussion Pevnick argues that jurisdiction can be seen as a kind of collective property 
right and that this is different from a private property right, ‘because the bundle of rights 
included in the claims of ownership that make up private property differs from the bundle of 
rights that constitute claims of jurisdiction’(Pevnick 2011: 44). That the ownership claim is in 
fact a claim of collective property right (and not a claim of private property right) is because 
decisions about the institutions over which the community has an ownership claim are taken 
through collective decision-making. The right to decide over the future of the political 
institutions therefore lies with the collective as a whole, and not the private individual. But the 
reason that follows this argument is this: 
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‘[B]y jointly constructing state institutions and contributing the resources necessary for 
their continuing feasibility, the citizenry gains an ownership claim that affords them at least 
some discretion in making future decisions about how those resources will be used’ 
(Pevnick 2011: 44) 
 
This argument for collective property rights through contribution does not immediately solve 
the problem for the non-contributor, because if he is not ‘contributing the resources necessary’, 
he does not gain an ownership claim and therefore is not part of the citizenry41. Instead, it leaves 
us with option b): that the non-contributor does not have an ownership claim, is therefore, upon 
closer examination, not a member and can, in principle, be deported. There could be at least 
three ways of responding to this. 
The first response could be to suggest that those whom we have called unemployed non-
contributors do, in fact, contribute. They do this through indirect taxation paid on goods, and 
moreover they can contribute to society in other ways such as conforming to the laws of the 
state, participate in democratic activities or perhaps even looking after children, taking care of 
the elderly etc. This would solve the problem at hand in so far as it makes it possible for all 
actual citizens to be counted as contributors. But broadening the conception of contribution may 
come at a cost. If contribution is defined so broadly, it does not seem to require all that much to 
do it. And this affects the strength of the ownership claim – perhaps even obliterating the 
relevant difference between members and non-members or, in the case of immigration, between 
citizens and would-be immigrants. There does, however, seem to be one uncircumventable 
difference between citizens and would-be immigrants: in order for would-be immigrants to 
contribute to the state which they wish to enter, they need to be fall under its jurisdiction; Even 
though they contribute to the institutions in their own community in the same way as a citizen, 
they are not contributing to the same institutions as the citizens of the political community of 
which the would-be immigrant wants to become a member. The closest a would-be immigrant 
can come to contributing, without being allowed in, is presumably to accept the rules governing 
migration to the country in question – even though this may entail that same citizen not being 
granted entrance into the community. 
                                                           
41
 Referring to the person’s legal status as a citizen does not seem to solve this because the requirements for 
being a citizen in real life do not immediately correspond to the requirements of the AO view. 
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The second option is to bite the bullet and declare that it is, in fact, an inherent risk that 
the unemployed non-contributors in principle lose their ownership claim and can therefore 
rightfully be expelled, but that such policies are very rarely seen in real world cases. This 
solution does not seem satisfactory, because to justify the normative justification of self-
determination on empirical real world cases does not seem like the route in which Pevnick 
himself wants to go.  In another example concerning our intuitions about paternalistic invasion 
of states, for instance, Pevnick argues against Buchanan that: 
 
‘these kinds of pragmatic considerations depend on empirical claims that may or may not 
obtain and do not explain the full range of our intuitive objection to paternalistic invasion’ 
(Pevnick 2011: 46). 
 
That the justification for the Associative Ownership view should not rest on an empirical claim 
which can be disputed empirically, but should rather rest on our common intuitions about 
justice and logical reasoning, seems reasonable to assume if we take the above quote into 
consideration. If our assumptions are in compliance with our intuitions about justice, self-
determination, paternalistic invasion, expulsion of unemployed non-contributors, or whatever 
we are discussing, it has the most weight according to Pevnick regardless of its actual presence 
in the real world. But if we assume this position, we are back with the consequence of 
unemployed non-contributors facing the threat of expulsion from their country. 
The third response would be to say that even though non-contributors do not have an 
ownership claim over the state institutions, they are so enmeshed in the social scheme of 
cooperation that it would be unjust to exclude them. And that this is true, unlike in the baby 
example, even if non-contributors can rightfully be said to not contribute (at least partly) 
because of their own fault. 
While I personally find the latter response most convincing I do not find it to be a 
response that entirely answers the fundamental issue brought up about the justification of the 
theory. Rather than actually solving the non-contributor problem, it seems to put brackets 
around the issue, and move on. While I do think it, for now, is impossible to settle the matter 
definitively, as Pevnick does not provide the answer himself, let alone discuss the matter 
directly, the solution for now leaves the problem with Pevnick, not us. 
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Before moving on to the next issue of this chapter, the state and autonomy, let us sum up 
our discussion about labour and its relation to immigration restrictions; as we recall the actual 
contribution through labour given by someone to a given political institution is exactly what 
demarcates “members” from “non-members” (leaving out non-contributors in this equation cf. 
above). Non-members do not have this special relationship to any given benefits, they have not 
created or contributed to it, and can therefore legitimately be excluded from it (Pevnick 2011: 
36). But what actually counts as contribution, whether there is a threshold to pass before being 
counted as a contributor and at what level this threshold should be put at - none of this is clear. 
What we know is only that some amount of contribution grants ownership over the institution 
one has contributed to. As we shall see below, when the argument is extended more directly to 
cover states, the relation between ownership and contribution is perhaps the most fundamental 
establishment of the justification for border control. Why is border control on a base level 
justified within the Associative Ownership view? Because ownership, through labouring toward 
creating or contributing to a good (i.e. political institution), alters your relation to that good in a 
way that gives you a special relationship with it. This is a relationship that non-members do not 
have and with which they therefore do not have rights associated, no matter how big their 
interests may be in it. Still, there are, as we have already mentioned, limitations on this – cf. the 
third premise in Becker’s formulation, which most notably applies to children of illegal 
immigrants, as well as refugees seeking international protection. The question we shall explore 
now is how you can expand the Associate Ownership view argument about self-determination 
from voluntary groups to states. 
 
State, autonomy and border control 
Up until now, we have considered the question self-determination, both in terms of voluntary 
groups and non-voluntary groups. But what how do we actually justify extending the right of 
self-determination onto non-voluntary associations, such as states within the framework of AO? 
The immediate problem that arises is that states are, by nature, non-voluntary. Because of this, 
we cannot ground self-determination in individual autonomy. Increasing the autonomy of the 
state does not necessarily increase the autonomy of the individual member (Pevnick 2011: 28-
29). Instead, self-determination is grounded in ownership claims — if you own something, you 
have the right to determine its future decisions etc. Pevnick argues that this holds true even in 
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non-voluntary associations and tries to show this through two examples: the example of the 
kidnapped lecturers and the example of the family farm. Both of these display different but 
equally important features that are analogous to that of a state. 
In the first example, the example of the kidnapped lecturers, Pevnick tries to show that 
ownership claims are possible even in non-voluntary associations. The example goes like this: 
 
‘Unhappy with the high price of education and the low quality of publicly available 
political theory lectures, Mary kidnaps several promising young political theorists. Holding 
them in captivity and under threat, she forces them to work together recording a series of 
bold and captivating lectures. Just as the lectures are completed, the police are tipped off, 
Mary is arrested, and the political theorists are freed. In the wake of this story, the lectures 
become a kind of public curiosity and sell widely (at least by political theory’s modest 
standards).’ (Pevnick 2011: 37). 
 
Here the lecturers clearly stand in a non-voluntary relationship with their social situation; they 
are forced into this so-called social scheme of cooperation. Nevertheless, they have ownership 
over the lectures they have created and they can decide on what to do with them, as well with 
whatever profits these might create. To me it seems plausible that this conclusion is in line with 
our moral intuition; you own what you create. Furthermore it also lives up to the requirements 
of the labour argument for self-determination. Where this gets interesting, however, is that, 
according to Pevnick, the example described above is analogous to the relation the citizenry 
have with the state; even though it is a non-voluntary relationship between the citizens and the 
state, the former still have ownership over the institutions of the latter. According to the 
“kidnapped lecturers-example”, then, the right to self-determination can be extended from 
voluntary groups to non-voluntary associations such as states. 
In a second example, the example of the family farm, Pevnick tries to show that 
ownership of state institutions can be passed on from generation to generation. The fact that 
people can be born into citizenship is a further qualification than the one above with the 
kidnapped lecturers. When a person gains citizenship-by-birth, it does not seem like that action 
qualifies to fulfil the requirement of labouring ones way to an ownership-relation with the state 
in the same way the kidnapped lecturers laboured their way to creating their lectures. Indeed 
Pevnick stresses this point and takes a completely other tack. To him, citizenship-by-birth is 
instead comparable to an inheritance - like a family farm business, where the child of two 
parents is granted equal membership to the farm, through its parent’s decision (Pevnick 2011: 
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37). This in turn gives the child an ownership claim over the institution of the farm, although 
some of the privileges included in the membership are suspended until the child comes of age 
(ibid: 37). The analogy is that both the family farm and the construction of state institutions are 
historical projects, which extend across generations – a kind of passing on of political 
institutions’ legacy, as Pevnick explains (ibid: 39). And to make this process work, new 
members must be accepted.  A way to pass the institutions on is through inheritance, whether 
this is inheriting a share in the family farm or inheriting citizenship and, in effect, ownership 
over state institutions. 
We can now return to the earlier question of what the difference, ownership-wise, 
between a newborn and a would-be immigrant is. It is true that one notable, common feature 
between the two is that neither can be said to satisfy the conditions of the labour-argument. 
However, the important element to keep in mind is that it is the right of the community to 
decide who should become a member and who should not. A country can decide on giving 
citizenship to people being born on its territory, or citizenship can follow the nationality of the 
parents, for instance.  It is because of the countries’ rules that newborns acquire these 
privileges, and it just so happen to be that in most states your citizenship-by-birth will follow 
your parents’ citizenship. But this also entails that the community could just as easily decide to 
grant citizenship to the would-be immigrant. In fact, most states do grant citizenship to 
immigrants as well, albeit only in certain cases. The way to obtain such a citizenship for 
immigrants may be long, and it varies from country to country, but it is definitely a possibility 
for some. 
Here it should be noted that simple contributions, such as not breaking the law, seldom 
seem to qualify sufficiently as “contributions” to lead to actual ownership, i.e. residence or 
citizenship in real world cases. Neither does simply being born into a society intuitively seem to 
be enough of a “contribution” to satisfy the labour-argument. So the case of the newborn seems 
to go against the reasoning behind the labour-argument, as the newborn cannot be said to have 
contributed. The labour-argument in itself cannot account for the fairness of being granted 
membership of an association by simply being born into it. It seems as if it must be a form of 
exception to the labour-argument which our discussion from earlier supports – and so, the 
labour-argument is likely to be a sufficient condition for ownership, but not a necessary 
condition, as there are other routes to acquiring ownership. It is not through contribution, but 
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through inheritance that the newborn acquires ownership. But if it is ok for newborns to inherit 
ownership, and if we can assume that most (or at least many) persons living in a society have 
inherited their citizenship, couldn’t we just solve the problem with the unemployed non-
contributor by saying that he inherited these rights and therefore he has an ownership claim 
over the political institutions? I will argue that if one follows this route, accepting this claim 
entails limiting the labour-argument to account only for initial ownership, because, as we saw 
above, there are other routes to ownership than contribution. I therefore restate that the AO-
view needs a conception about individual responsibility to supplement the labour-argument. 
The exact configuration of this will define the strength of the labour-argument. 
Let us then repeat our tentative solution to the problem from before, that an unemployed 
non-contributor is so enmeshed in the social scheme of cooperation, that it would be unjust to 
exclude him. There are reasons of justice that outweighs the labour-argument here. Reasons that 
also grant the non-contributor an ownership claim. I would propose to look at it this way: there 
are, in fact, different justifications of communities’ right to self-determination, even within AO. 
One is an “ownership-by-contribution view” (cf. the labour-argument). In this view you get 
rights of self-determination on the basis of your contribution to the political institutions. 
Another is simply an “ownership-by-default view”, where there are reasons of justice that 
transcend reasons of ownership, such as the examples of the newborn and, possibly, the 
unemployed non-contributor. While these two views often overlap, they nevertheless represent 
different ways of becoming a member of a community. 
But why is this not the same for the would-be immigrant? Given the nature of the situation 
of a would-be immigrant, such a person is exactly not ‘so enmeshed in the social scheme of 
cooperation, that it would be unjust to exclude him’. This is true even if the would-be 
immigrant would like to contribute. As Pevnick argues: 
 
‘I may have been happy to contribute to the founding of Google, but this is insignificant In 
the face of the fact that I did not. The founders of Google do not fail to treat me as an equal 
when they, in the process of refusing my claim to their bounty, point this out. These are 
goods established only through the joint labor of members as coordinated by the 
association.’ (Pevnick 2011: 36). 
 
Ownership at first hand is gained by contributing and so would-be immigrants can be justifiably 
excluded because they did not contribute – no matter how much they would have liked to. This 
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means that would-be immigrants do not have an ownership claim by way of the ownership-by-
contribution view. And because they are not in a position to either inherit ownership, or already 
find themselves enmeshed in the social scheme of cooperation with the community, they do not 
satisfy the ownership-by-default view. We can then conclude that, according to the AO view, it 
is possible for a community to have ownership over state institutions, and in effect have self-
determination, and to decide whether to include or exclude would-be immigrants. We can now 
supplement our first logical formulation of the AO-view to include states so that it looks like 
this: 
 
P1: Contributing to an institution gives you an ownership claim over that institution 
P2: If all members of a community contribute to an institution they have a collective 
ownership claim over that institution 
P3: Having collective ownership over institutions grounds the right to make future 
decisions about the shape and direction of such institutions, including who can 
become a member 
P4: The right to make future decisions about the shape and direction of an institution 
is equal to having self-determination 
P5: This is also true in cases where the community is that of a territorial state 
C:  A community with self-determination is justified in controlling immigration 
 
The only additional note we need to make here is that P5 asserts that the right to choose who 
can become a member, when discussing territorial states, is equal to the right to control 
immigration. Evidence that this is true has been provided earlier in the chapter through the 
discussion about extending the AO view from voluntary to non-voluntary associations. Let us 
make a preliminary summary of what we have found thus far, before entering into the 
discussion as to whether the theory can be applied to the EU level. 
The Associative Ownership view holds that political communities have a right to self-
determination because they have contributed to the creation of institutions and thereby have an 
ownership claim over these and that this conception could be extended to cover non-voluntary 
associations, such as states. The discussion about the non-contributor opened up for a new 
interpretation of how to justify communities’ right of self-determination into an ownership-by-
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contribution view and an ownership-by-default view. Furthermore, we saw that the AO-view 
could be defended against the Kymlicka critique about self-ownership, but that this entailed an 
important aspect of the conception of ownership – namely that the types of entitlements that 
arise as a result of ownership claims are in important aspects limited – other considerations may 
outweigh ownership claims. In the next section, we will take these findings and discuss whether 
they are applicable at the level of the European Union as well. 
 
Associative Ownership and the EU 
In this section we are going to examine whether the AO-view can be applied beyond the nation 
state level. That is, to see if the most fundamental arguments of the AO-view can work in an 
EU-context the same way it worked on the nation state level. As we have already examined 
earlier, this is relevant because in the present day, border control is often greater than a nation 
state matter. The requirements to cross the membership border (obtaining residence or 
citizenship) are largely defined by the individual member states of the EU. However, the 
physical border control is regulated as a shared activity between EU institutions, such as 
Frontex, and the member states. Furthermore, policies such as the Schengen agreement are 
administered at a supranational basis, and the EU are working to create a Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS) so that the burden of refugees will be spread out more equally 
throughout the union. All of these developments pose questions about the AO-view’s 
applicability in real-world European cases. The difficulty occurs when the power to control the 
issue you are discussing (immigration) are gradually moving from the type of community you 
are dealing with (national communities) to another type of community (international 
communities – in our case the EU-community). Can it simply be extended directly from the 
national to the European level, or will it have to be modified in some way to be applicable?  
The core arguments of the AO-view 
Let us begin with looking at the basic features of the AO-view. In our previous section, we 
formulated the AO-view as an argument that looked like this: 
 
P1: Contributing to an institution gives you an ownership claim over that institution 
P2: If all members of a community contribute to an institution they have a collective 
ownership claim over that institution 
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P3: Having collective ownership over institutions grounds the right to make future 
decisions about the shape and direction of such institutions, including who can 
become a member 
P4: The right to make future decisions about the shape and direction of an institution 
is equal to having self-determination 
P5: This is also true in cases where the community is that of a territorial state 
C:  A community with self-determination is justified in controlling immigration 
 
We can use this as a starting point for our discussion and try to examine whether each premise 
can be applied to the EU level directly, or whether it needs modification. To begin with, we can 
identify the key concepts, and see if shifting the setting to the EU-level leads to any significant 
complications in the argument. These are questions that first come to mind: what institutions are 
we dealing with in the EU context? How can you contribute to these? How should we 
understand the term “community” in this context? Does the concept of a national community 
translate well into an international community? How should we understand collective 
ownership and self-determination in the EU-context? Who should be considered a member? As 
you may have noticed, in listing these questions we have actually not mentioned immigration 
control directly. This is because according to the AO-view, the right to control immigration 
follows from self-determination, with all its inherent limitations. If we can show that the EU-
community has the right of self-determination, or that it does not, then we can deduce whether 
they consequently have or do not have the right of immigration control. Let us start by 
examining what institutions are relevant in the EU-context and how ownership of them can be 
claimed. 
EU Institutions, goods and ownership 
What EU-institutions are relevant for the AO-view? On the one hand, we have the actual, 
political EU-institutions such as the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council etc., 
which are all obvious inclusions. But the EU is in fact little more than its member states and the 
political EU institutions combined. Being a member of a member state community therefore 
makes you a member of the EU community. And how do you become a member of the national 
community?; by ways of an ownership claim over the national institutions. Thus, no member 
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states, no EU. In addition to the political institutions, which could be characterized as providing 
the rules for which goods should be provided and how they should be carried out, there are all 
the institutions that directly provide the goods that members enjoy: welfare institutions such as 
schools, universities, hospitals, day-care centres etc. The political EU-institutions, such as the 
EP, the Council and the Commission all play an important role in providing the laws and rules 
concerning these goods. And these rules in turn govern the national community’s conduct to 
provide the rules for its own institutions to provide goods for its citizens. Furthermore, EU-
institutions, such as the internal market or Frontex, EASO etc., are come into play here. For 
instance, by creating an area of freedom of movement for goods, capital, services and people, 
the internal market has become an increasingly important aspect of the production of goods and, 
overall, a valuable part of the EU. Similarly, Frontex and EASO are involved in other forms of 
goods creation on a common EU-level. All told, these are institutions and goods that can be 
owned but are also intermingled. The question then is how you can own these institutions? 
The AO-view is principally concerned with collective ownership claims over institutions 
(as opposed to individual ownership which is another discussion) and to gain such a claim, a 
community must jointly contribute to these institutions42, or gain the ownership claim by 
default. While we, in our earlier discussion, had to acknowledge the opacity of this matter, we 
agreed that there exist both material as well as non-material ways of contributing to institutions. 
These could be paying taxes, democratic participation and abiding the laws of the state, and 
presumably other ways as well. The opacity of the matter was on the one hand how much 
contribution one needed to contribute with in order to gain an ownership claim, and on the other 
hand, how these different forms of contribution played out together. After considering these 
different types of contribution to EU institutions, we will discuss the ownership-by-default view 
as an alternative way of gaining ownership. 
Assessing contribution is actually a bit complicated in the EU-context. A reason for this is 
the manner in which the goods of the EU are financed and administered. The EU does have its 
own income, which is based on tariffs on sugar and commerce with non-EU countries on the 
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 Perhaps this is also the right place to spell out that by joint contribution it is not meant that it should 
actually be carried out together, at the same time. It is meant as contributing to the same institution in a way 
that helps create or sustain that institution and thereby render you a member of the community who holds the 
collective ownership claim. 
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one hand, and a more direct contribution coming from the member states based on the VAT-
basis of those member states, as well as a contribution based on the Gross National Income 
(GNI) of the member states (EU oplysningen 18.09.2013). The majority of the income comes 
directly from the member states, through the contribution based on the VAT-basis (11%) and 
the income based on the GNI (74%), which together account for 85 % of EU’s income (ibid). If 
we focus on the 85% of income contributed by the member states, then we see that it is the 
citizens of the member states who, through national taxation, ultimately generate this 
contribution. In this way, each tax-paying resident of the EU has contributed to its political 
institutions. However, as we saw before, national institutions providing goods for its citizens are 
also an important part of the equation. The fact that most of the actual goods provided are 
administered by the member states themselves does not change this conclusion. This is because 
the goods in question are a result of decisions agreed upon within the EU system, and so goods, 
while to some extent paid for and administered by the member states, are nevertheless still 
evaluated as under the auspices of the EU. The fact that they are administered by the member 
states seems more like a practical matter than being crucial to the core of the AO-view. And 
again, there is a strong case to be made that providing goods on the national level is equal to 
partly providing goods at the EU level. This makes it possible that the members of the 
community (EU) have a collective ownership claim. This all accounts for the material 
contribution in our examination so far. Non-material contribution includes, as we can recall, 
abiding by the law and democratic participation. I would argue that, overall, these means of 
contribution follow the same pattern as material contribution. Contributing by abiding with the 
laws of the member state you belong to works in the same way as paying taxes. The actual type 
of contribution is of course different but both types are ways of contributing to the functionality 
of an institution. In this way, abiding by the national laws counts towards contributing to the EU 
institutions in as much as the EU consists of its member states – is similar to the case with 
material contribution. Contribution to the institutions of a member state, then, is a form of 
contribution to the full EU-community. Similarly, democratic participation at a national level is 
also a form of contribution on the larger EU-level. These were the forms of contribution we 
have found to be crucial to the attainment of ownership claims over institutions. It seems that, 
so far, the AO-view can be extended to the EU-level without moderation. We also considered 
another way of gaining ownership claims: through the rights-by-default view of ownership. 
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The rights-by-default view encompasses persons’ ownership claim arising from other 
sources of justice than contribution, and includes prior discussions such as that of the newborn 
and the unemployed non-contributor. In those cases, it was argued that their ownership claim 
resulted from inheritance and/or because such persons find themselves so enmeshed in the 
system of social cooperation that it would be unjust to exclude them. If we, for the time being, 
assume that the EU counts as a community in the AO sense – a matter we will return to shortly 
– and that an ownership claim can arise through contributing to its institutions, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the rights-by-default view also applies as a way of obtaining an 
ownership claim over the institutions of the community. In the case of the newborn, inheritance 
follows the same order at the EU level as at the national level, in as much as its parents could be 
said to be a member of the EU community. In the case of the unemployed non-contributor, the 
same conditions seem to apply. Only here it means that our original unsolved challenge with the 
unemployed non-contributor seems intact and that we cannot give an adequate answer to the 
question before this matter has been resolved – a task that lies beyond this thesis. Consequently, 
the rights-by-default view also applies at the EU level as a way of obtaining ownership over its 
institution. 
The EU-community and its members 
How should we understand the term community in the EU-context? And in what way would 
such a community relate to the communities of the member states? What actually qualifies as a 
community is an important question, because in the AO view it is a community’s right of self-
determination that gives the community the right to border control. This means the community 
is the principal right-bearer, when discussing immigration issues. Consequently, we first need to 
assess whether there indeed exists a community in the same sense as understood in the AO 
view, and who we consider as being members of said community, if we are to assess the 
possibility of a normative right of immigration control for the EU.  
The core meaning of a community within the AO-view is simply to signify a group of 
people. As we have already seen, this group of people - the community - can have rights such as 
the right to decide who can become a member of the community. And they have this right as a 
derivative of their right to self-determination. The reason they are justified in having self-
determination is because they own the institutions from which they are limiting would-be 
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members in profiting. So far so good, what I have just described should come as no surprise at 
this point. The question at hand now is who actually counts as members of this EU community. 
The most obvious candidates are citizens and permanent residents of EU-member states; these 
are certainly members of the EU-community. They all have an ownership claim over the EU 
institutions, either by having contributed to these or by default. This seems to be a 
straightforward conclusion. What is not as straight forward is the status of the EU’s many 
irregular migrants. Should these, in fact, also be seen as members of the community? 
Many irregular immigrants contribute in the material sense, by working on the black 
labour market and thereby supporting the economy. While there could certainly be made a case 
for this meriting them membership, this contribution is at the same time clearly in conflict with 
the self-determination of the community, as they are not allowed into the state’s territory in the 
first place. Pevnick discusses this problem as well, and provides the following example as an 
argument against irregular immigrants being members of the community: 
 
‘A group of childhood friends each month wire money into a bank account under an 
agreement that when they reach the needed sum of money, they will together purchase a 
vacation home which they will then share. John, who is not a friend of the group, seeks 
access to a vacation home but cannot afford one on his own. Hearing of the above scheme, 
he begins to wire money into the bank account without the agreement of the group. After 
the group has raised the requisite amount of money and purchased the home, John steps 
forward – produces receipts documenting his contributions – and demands an equal place 
in the group.’ (Pevnick 2011: 165). 
 
According to Pevnick, even though John has contributed to the group’s goals it would seem 
strange to say that he has a right of inclusion in the group (Pevnick 2011: 166). The problem is 
that, in order to be able to contribute, John has ignored the consent of the group and 
consequently not respected their right of self-determination. The group has a prior claim over 
the institutions that they own, which came before John’s claim about membership based on the 
contribution to the institutions he made. This example is analogous to the case of irregular 
immigrants in as much as them entering a foreign country’s territory also ignores the consent of 
the community of that territory. Pevnick therefore concludes that irregular immigrants should 
not be seen as members of the community, despite their contribution to it. 
This is yet another case where the AO-view recognizes competing claims of justice. While 
the irregular immigrant does have an ownership claim over the institutions to which he has 
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contributed, the community also has an ownership claim. And this ownership claim is prior to 
that of the irregular immigrant. Because the irregular immigrant did not have the consent of the 
community prior to his contribution, his contribution does not give him the right to be a 
member of the community. But where does this leave the irregular immigrant? Is he forced to 
return to his home state, despite, perhaps, having lived several years in a member state? And are 
all irregular immigrants are forced to return? At the face of it, unless the community for some 
reason decides that they can stay43, this would be the consequence. Unlike a newborn for 
instance, an irregular immigrant is in this position ‘through a fault of his own’. On the other 
side, the-AO view does allow for the right of self-determination to be trumped, albeit only in 
cases where other considerations of justice outweigh this right. As we can recall, a good 
example of this was cases of refugees, both economic and otherwise. So, if the irregular 
immigrant can be considered a person in need, the receiving country does have a duty to offer 
him protection, according to the AO-view. But becoming a member in this way would be to 
gain rights-by-default, rather than rights-through-contribution. It is not by virtue of the irregular 
immigrant’s contribution to the communities’ institutions that he is given membership, but by 
reasons of justice that outweigh the community’s claim of ownership. And so we can construct 
the line of reasoning thusly: irregular immigrants’ ownership claims are outweighed by the 
community’s right of self-determination, which in turn is outweighed by the duty to protect 
those in need of protection. 
 
Chapter summary 
The Associative Ownership view is principally interested in collective ownership claims and, 
consequently, the right of self-determination and immigration regulation; a community can have 
a collective ownership claim to the institutions they have contributed, and it is this ownership 
claim that gives them the right to decide what is to happen to the institutions - including who 
can become a member. This is what we have called the labour-argument, which is the basic 
justification for why a community, such as for instance a national community, can have the 
right to control immigration. But we have also seen that the labour-argument is merely 
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 Perhaps the most famous real example of this in Europe is from 2005, where Spain granted up to 700.000 
irregular immigrants a three-month amnesty, during which they could obtain a legal work-permit (Adler 
2005). 
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sufficient reason to give you an ownership claim (the ownership-by-contribution view) and that 
ownership claims can also originate in other ways within the AO-view (the ownership-by-
default view). This is why newborns as well as persons in need both can become members of 
the community, without having contributed to it. 
We then considered whether the AO-view could be applied to the EU-level and saw that it 
could, without any major adjustments. In AO-terms, the EU can indeed be considered as a 
community with self-determination and the right to control immigration. This is true regardless 
of whether the legal competence of immigration control is shared between the EU institutions 
and national institutions, because contributing to the institutions of ones own, national 
community also counts as contributing to the larger EU-community. Furthermore, we 
considered the question of whether EU member states could deny entry to immigrants from 
other member states. The conclusion was that this was only possible through secession from the 
larger EU-community. 
Discussing the AO-view, we also encountered some general difficulties, the most 
important of which is “the problem of the non-contributor”. The AO-view is not afflicted by 
Kymlicka’s critique of the Lockean Proviso. Nevertheless, the doubt raised as to what actually 
counts as contribution and how different forms of contribution relate to each other, as well as 
the lack of a conception about individual responsibility, made it unclear what exactly the 
difference between an unemployed non-contributor and a would-be immigrants was, besides the 
fact that they were born in different countries. This is a general challenge for the AO-view, and 
not just for its application to the EU level. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis, I have discussed matters relating to where the competence for 
immigration regulation lies in the EU-system and tried to pair my findings with two 
philosophical theories of immigration: Liberal Nationalism and Associative Ownership. The 
common thread has been to see how those theories manage when the exercising subject of 
border control instead of states is an international association such as the EU. This extension, 
from the national to the international, is the challenge I have posed for both the Liberal 
Nationalism position, in David Miller’s configuration, as well as the Associative Ownership 
position defended by Ryan Pevnick. In my study I have also come to see what immigration 
policies are actually being undertaken within the EU-system, as well as critically scrutinizing 
key assumptions in both Liberal Nationalism and Associative Ownership. Getting to know what 
is going on in the EU within the field of immigration policy has both highlighted the relevance 
of the main problem, and as well as helped to better inform us about the wishes and interests at 
play in the real case of EU. Looking more deeply into each theory has been necessary to locate 
key assumptions and to extrapolate the core arguments of each position, in order to enable an 
assessment of the positions’ applicability to the EU-level. 
Our main findings in regard to EU’s immigration policy have been that it is actually quite 
unclear who exactly controls the immigration policy. The competences of deciding immigration 
policy is in itself divided between the member states and the EU-institutions, and even within 
the latter, the decision-making procedure differs greatly, depending on which subject is 
discussed. Throughout the last couple of decades, there has been a move towards a 
Communitarisation of immigration policy, evolving from close to nothing, to an extensive 
cooperation in regard to controlling the external physical border, establishing Regional 
Protection Programmes and the abolishment of internal borders of the Union through the 
Schengen agreement, just to name a few. Moreover, the EU is undertaking several programmes 
with the aim of supporting each individual member state in such diverse immigration matters as 
attracting wanted labour, supporting national asylum systems and creating partnerships with 
third countries. But even so, the way the EU system is built implies negotiation between the 
different EU institutions and the member states in the EU-decision process. Policy decisions are 
then the result of political compromises between the member states and the EU institutions. 
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This entails that, even though we may be able to locate where the concrete competence of 
immigration regulation is placed, identifying who is actually in control overall is much harder 
to determine. I can conclude that while exactly whoever is in control of the immigration policy 
in the EU may be unclear, it has nevertheless to an increasing degree become an EU-matter. 
In chapter three, I discussed David Miller’s configuration of Liberal Nationalism. The 
arguments for why states can claim to have territorial rights were put forward and discussed. At 
the core of the justification of the state’s territorial rights lie the twin arguments, which we 
came to know as the efficiency and the occupancy–transformation arguments. The reason a 
state is justified in having a monopoly of authority over the territory it controls is that this is the 
most efficient way of organizing authority, and consequently the most beneficial system to the 
people subject to its authority. Through the occupancy–transformation argument, Miller further 
claims that people occupying a particular territory develop a special relationship with it through 
time. This relationship gives the people a claim over the added economic and cultural value that 
control over the territory, and the subsequent transformation of it, have produced. Justifying 
border control within Liberal Nationalism builds on the combination of why states are justified 
in having territorial rights and why particular states can have a claim to territorial rights over a 
particular territory. But it also builds on an appeal to the value of self-determination and having 
a national identity. 
This last part about self-determination and national identity is especially interesting in the 
context of extending Liberal Nationalism to the EU-level. In this discussion, we found that, 
when looking at the core of the arguments, Liberal Nationalism could in fact be extended to the 
EU-level. In terms of efficiency, the EU lived up to the requirement, in principle, being an 
effective institution in terms of enabling EU-citizens in basic societal activities, as well as 
exercising public planning throughout the territory. That the practice may be lagging behind the 
theory does not change this conclusion, unless it is shown that the EU system renders it too 
ineffective to satisfy the efficiency requirement. Similarly, with the occupancy–transformation 
argument, there seems to be no conclusive reason for why it cannot, in principle, apply to the 
EU. Seeing the EU as one big community, with its own political institutions, and a range of 
member states integral to the community that through time have occupied and transformed the 
region, does not seem to have any conceptual problems attached to it. The historicity of the 
matter may complicate assessing claims to territorial rights of a geographical area to an 
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immeasurable degree, and even though bringing international organizations into this equation 
does not make that any less complicated, it seems to be, if any at all, a possible challenge to the 
general theory, rather than with my extendibility challenge. Whether this is to be considered a 
real challenge to the theory or not depends on the standard to which the direct practical 
applicability of the theory on real world problems is held. Adherence to a national identity as a 
justification of EU-immigration restriction meanwhile seems a little harder to extend to the EU-
level directly. There is a big question as to what extent you are able to belong to more than one 
political community, in the sense that David Miller proposes, as being part of a community, 
with the right to self-determination, requires recognizing special obligations to ones 
compatriots. The widespread Euroscepticism in today’s EU may be evidence of this. A possible 
solution to the conceptual difficulty could be to recognize that the EU may be viewed as having 
something along the lines of a regional identity to which each national identity contributes and 
shares common values, thereby constituting a collected regional EU-identity. This conception 
would fit nicely with Vivien Schmidt’s conception about the EU as a regional state which was 
explored in chapter two. That the justification for border control rests partly on the interests of 
the people of a state is fundamental, and this in turn makes a system of democratic decision-
making essential. Here it seems that, principally speaking, Liberal Nationalism is perhaps not 
incompatible with the EU, but that the ambiguity about EU’s democratic credentials for the 
time being excludes a straightforward application of Liberal Nationalism. 
In chapter four, I discussed the Associative Ownership view. Associative Ownership takes 
its point of departure in ownership claims over institutions, which ground a community’s right 
to self-determination and, consequently, their right to control immigration. The basic 
justification for ownership over institutions is that ownership claims are obtained by 
contributing to the institution. This is what I termed the labour-argument that enabled an 
ownership-by-contribution view. But as my study also revealed, the labour argument is only a 
sufficient reason to gain an ownership claim over institutions. Another way of qualifying that 
claim is what I termed the ownership-by-default view, which explains why newborns and 
refugees, for example, should be given an ownership claim without having contributed to the 
institutions. 
In my study of the Associative Ownership view, I encountered some weaknesses in the 
position, most importantly the problem of the unemployed non-contributor and the lack of a 
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developed theory about individual responsibility. The problem of the non-contributor is 
basically that an unemployed non-contributor, at the face of it, satisfies neither the ownership-
by-contribution view nor the ownership-by-default view. This discussion shed light on the fact 
that what actually counts as contribution is generally quite unclear and the absence of a clear 
definition diffuses what exactly distinguishes the unemployed non-contributor from the would-
be immigrant, aside from the brute luck of being born inside or outside a community. If not 
properly dealt with, this weakness may undermine the justification for border control in the 
Associative Ownership view. My study also showed that the labour-argument needs to be 
supplemented with a more explicated conception about individual responsibility. This is 
because the labour argument cannot in itself account for the fairness of being granted 
membership of an association by simply being born into it. 
Just as with the discussion of Liberal Nationalism, I located the core arguments of 
Associative Ownership and assessed whether these could be extended to cover the EU-level in 
the same way as the nation state level. My overall findings were that Associative Ownership 
could be extended to the EU-level, and quite directly as well. The core idea, that a community 
with self-determination has the right to control immigration, on grounds of the community 
members’ ownership claim over their institutions, fits nicely within the concept of the EU. This 
is true regardless of the legal competence of immigration control being shared between the EU 
institutions and national institutions, as contributing to the institutions of ones own, national, 
community also counts as contributing to the larger EU-community. By contributing to the 
well-functioning of the German community’s political institutions you are also contributing to 
the European political community. 
Comparing the two positions’ extendability, it can be argued that Liberal Nationalism 
seems possible to extend, but not without a reconfiguration of the concept of national identity, 
whereas Associative Ownership have proved highly extendable and can, more or less, be 
directly applied to the EU-level. Associative Ownership has some critical issues with the 
general theory, however, that will need to be solved before it can really take off and Go 
International. 
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